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A. 미국과 북한, 「전쟁위기(戰爭危機)」





美 前 국방장관, 미국 신문에 말하다





페리(William Perry) 前 국방장관(國防長官)은 7월15일자 미국 신문 워싱턴포스트(The Washington Post)에 게재(揭載)된 기사에서, 미국과 북한이 전쟁에 돌입(突入)하는 위험성(危險性)이 높아지고 있다고 말했다.





또한, 북한이 핵실험(核實驗)이나 핵탄두(核彈頭)의 수출(輸出)을 강행(强行)하는 것에 대한 염려(念慮)를 표명(表明)하며, 『6개월 전에 올바른 일을 했다면 [북한의 핵문제는] 처리할 수 있었지만, 우리는 올바른 일을 하지 않았다』라고 말해 부시(George W. Bush) 美 정권(政權)의 대응(對應) 강하게 비판(批判)했다.





동지(同紙)의 취재(取材)에 페리씨는, 美 정부(政府) 고관(高官), 노무현(盧武鉉) 한국 대통령, 중국 정부 고관(高官) 등과 회담(會談)해, 이러한 결론(結論)에 이르렀다고 설명(說明)하며 『마감시간이 목전(目前)에 닥쳤다. 위기(危機)가 심각화(深刻化) 되고 있다』라고 말했다.





부시 정권이 핵(核)이나 미사일 기술(技術)의 확산(擴散)을 막기 위해서 선박(船舶)에 대한 임검(臨檢) 등의 강화(强化)를 목표로 하고 있는 것에 대하여는 『도발적(挑發的)인 것만으로 효과적(效果的)인 것은 아니다』라고 비판했다. 그 이유로서 『농구공보다 작은 플루토늄(plutonium)을 옮기는데 선박은 필요없다」라고 말했다.











[THE WASHINGTON POST]





U.S., N. Korea Drifting Toward War, Perry Warns





Former Defense Secretary Says Standoff Increases Risk of


Terrorists Obtaining Nuclear Device





By Thomas E. Ricks and Glenn Kessler





Washington Post Staff Writers





Tuesday, July 15, 2003; Page A14





Former defense secretary William Perry warned that the


United States and North Korea are drifting toward war,


perhaps as early as this year, in an increasingly dangerous


standoff that also could result in terrorists being able to


purchase a North Korean nuclear device and plant it in a


U.S. city.





"I think we are losing control" of the situation, said


Perry, who believes North Korea soon will have enough


nuclear warheads to begin exploding them in tests and


exporting them to terrorists and other U.S.


adversaries. "The nuclear program now underway in North


Korea poses an imminent danger of nuclear weapons being


detonated in American cities," he said in an interview.





Perry added that he reached his conclusions after extensive


conversations with senior Bush administration officials,


South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun and senior officials in


China.





After weeks of debate, President Bush and his senior foreign


policy advisers this week are expected to meet to resolve


the administration's next step in the crisis over North


Korea's nuclear programs. Officials have discussed how


sharply to ratchet up the pressure, and how to react to a


series of possible North Korean provocations, including


nuclear tests.





Perry is the most prominent member of a growing number of


national security experts and Korea specialists who are


expressing deep concern about the direction of U.S. policy


toward Pyongyang.





As President Bill Clinton's defense secretary, he oversaw


preparation for airstrikes on North Korean nuclear


facilities in 1994, an attack that was never carried out. He


has remained deeply involved in Korean policy issues and is


widely respected in national security circles, especially


among senior military officers.





They credit him with playing a key role in developing the


U.S. high-tech arsenal of cruise missiles and stealth


aircraft and also with righting the Pentagon after the


short, turbulent term of Les Aspin, Clinton's first defense


chief.





Only last winter Perry publicly argued that the North Korea


problem was controllable. Now, he said, he has grown to


doubt that. "It was manageable six months ago if we did the


right things," he said. "But we haven't done the right


things."





He added: "I have held off public criticism to this point


because I had hoped that the administration was going to act


on this problem, and that public criticism might be


counterproductive. But time is running out, and each month


the problem gets more dangerous."





Since the crisis over North Korea's nuclear ambitions


erupted last October, when officials in Pyongyang disclosed


they had a secret program to enrich uranium, the Bush


administration has sought to pressure the regime into giving


up its nuclear programs without offering inducements or


entering into negotiations.





Administration officials - who came into office highly


skeptical of the Clinton administration's 1994 deal that


froze North Korea's nuclear programs - have sought to enlist


Japan, South Korea and China to join in isolating North


Korea, and have begun laying the groundwork for a maritime


campaign to shut down North Korea's narcotics and weapons


smuggling operations.





North Korea has insisted on direct bilateral negotiations


with Washington, although officials briefly participated in


trilateral talks with China and the United States, and over


the months it has taken increasingly provocative steps.





It ousted international inspectors, restarted a shuttered


nuclear facility and appears to have reprocessed at least a


few hundred of 8,000 spent fuel rods that can provide


plutonium for weapons. The spent fuel would give North Korea


enough nuclear material to build two to three nuclear bombs


within a few months, doubling the estimated size of its


arsenal.





Last week, North Korean officials told the administration


they had completed reprocessing all of the fuel rods - an


assertion that U.S. officials have not been able to confirm


through available intelligence.





Officials at the Pentagon, State Department and White House


declined to respond to Perry's criticism on the record. But


speaking anonymously, administration officials vehemently


disagreed with his analysis, saying they have succeeded in


building a multilateral consensus that North Korea's nuclear


program is unacceptable, leaving Pyongyang increasingly


isolated.





The administration has no intention of rewarding North Korea


for giving up its weapons, officials said, adding that the


new effort to target North Korea's illegal sources of


revenue will only further weaken North Korea.





The administration policy toward North Korea, however, has


been characterized by fierce disputes among senior


policymakers, which officials privately acknowledge have


hampered the administration's response.





"There is an ongoing search for consensus within the


administration itself," said Nicholas Eberstadt of the


American Enterprise Institute. "The lack of a consensus to a


significant extent has prevented U.S. policy from unfolding."





In a two-hour interview in his office at Stanford


University, Perry said that after conversations with several


senior administration officials from different areas of the


government, he is persuaded that the Korea policy is in


disarray. Showing some emotion, the usually reserved Perry


said at one point, "I'm damned if I can figure out what the


policy is."





Nor, having had extensive contacts with Asian leaders, does


Perry believe that the multilateral diplomatic approach is


working. "I see no evidence of that," he said. "The


diplomatic track, as nearly as I can discern, is


inconsequential."





From his discussions, Perry has concluded the president


simply won't enter into genuine talks with Pyongyang's


Stalinist government. "My theory is the reason we don't have


a policy on this, and we aren't negotiating, is the


president himself," Perry said. "I think he has come to the


conclusion that Kim Jong Il is evil and loathsome and it is


immoral to negotiate with him."





The immediate cause of concern, Perry said, is that North


Korea appears to have begun reprocessing the spent fuel


rods. "I have thought for some months that if the North


Koreans moved toward processing, then we are on a path


toward war," he said.





Perry's comments, while unusually blunt from a former senior


policymaker, reflect an increasing consensus among other


specialists that the administration, distracted by Iraq, has


allowed the North Korean crisis to spiral out of control.





"I'm not sure where our policy is going," said retired Army


Gen. Robert W. RisCassi, a former U.S. commander in Korea.


But, he added, "I don't know if I would be as doomsday as


Bill Perry is at this juncture," in part, because he


believes a diplomatic solution is still possible.





James M. Bodner, a former top policy official at the Clinton-


era Pentagon, said that the Bush administration essentially


has a policy of ignoring North Korea as much as possible.


The trouble, he said, is that it doesn't have time on its


side, because North Korea's moves are likely soon to begin


altering the politics of East Asia in a way that undermines


U.S. interests in the region.





Even some specialists who support Bush administration policy


think the situation is moving toward confrontation. "I think


it will be enormously significant" if North Korea tests a


nuclear warhead this year, said Paul Bracken, a Yale


University expert on Asian nuclear issues. "It'll force the


administration to take action - surgical strikes, perhaps."





Eberstadt described the current situation as "sitzkrieg,"


saying neither side has made its most obvious move. In North


Korea's case, that would be detonating an underground


nuclear device, he said, while for the United States it


would be to organize an international program of maritime


interdiction - a kind of loose embargo - to shut down


dangerous North Korean exports, including missile sales.





Perry argued that an interdiction strategy "would be


provocative, but it would not be effective" in preventing


the sale of nuclear material. "You don't need a ship to


transport a core of plutonium that is smaller than a


basketball," he said.





Rather than escalate in this way, Perry said, the


administration should engage in "coercive diplomacy," which


he explained as, "You have to offer something, but you have


to have an iron fist behind your offer." He didn't specify


what should be offered, but others have suggested that North


Korea would like economic aid, trade deals, diplomatic


recognition or a nonaggression pact.





http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56019-2003Jul14.html














B. 북한, 美에 「핵폭탄 6개 만들 수 있는 플루토늄 추출」…미국 신문





북한이 미국과의 협의(協議)에서, 사용후핵연료봉(使用後核燃料棒) 8000개의 재처리(再處理)를 6월30일에 종료(終了)했다는 것을 통고(通告)했다는 한국 연합뉴스의 보도(報道)에 대해, 美 정부(政府) 고관(高官)은 7월14일[워싱턴(Washington, D.C.) 시간], 잭 프리차드(Jack Pritchard,) 국무성(國務省) 한반도평화담당(韓半島平和擔當) 특사(特使) 등이 7월8일에 뉴욕(New York)에서 박길연(朴吉淵) 유엔 대사 등과 비공식(非公式) 협의를 실시(實施)한 것을 인정(認定)했다.





이것과 관련해서, 7월15일자 뉴욕타임즈(The New York Times)는, 복수(複數)의 美 정부(政府) 고관(高官)의 이야기로서, 7월8일 협의에서는 북한 외교관(外交官)이 핵연료봉의 재처리를 6월30일에 완료했다고 하는 성명문(聲明文)을 읽어 내리며 핵폭탄(核爆彈) 6개의 제조(製造)가 가능한 플루토늄(plutonium)을 추출(抽出)했다는 것을 밝혔다고 보도(報道)했다. 북한측은 게다가, 플루토늄을 사용해 즉시 핵무기(核武器) 제조에 착수(着手)하겠다는 의향(意向)을 표명(表明)했다고 한다.





이 고관에 의하면, 북한측은, 핵무기 제조에 걸리는 시간에 대해서는 언급하지 않았고, 핵무기를 제3국 등에 매도(賣渡)한다고 위협(威脅)하지도 않았다.





美 정부내에는, 美北 2국간 협의를 거부(拒否)하는 미국 때문에 초조해지는 북한이, 위기(危機)를 부추기려는 의도(意圖)로 새로운 술책(術策)을 들고 나왔다는 견해(見解)도 있어, 동지(同祗)는, 김정일(金正日) 정권(政權)이 정말로 플루토늄의 추출에 성공했는지 어떤지 美 정보기관(情報機關)이 판단하기 어려워하고 있다고 보도했다.








[THE NEW YORK TIMES]





North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel for Atom Bombs





By DAVID E. SANGER





WASHINGTON, July 14 - North Korean officials told the Bush


administration last week that they had finished producing


enough plutonium to make a half-dozen nuclear bombs, and


that they intended to move ahead quickly to turn the


material into weapons, senior American officials said today.





The new declaration set off a scramble in American


intelligence agencies - under fire for their assessment of


Iraq's nuclear capability - to determine if the North Korean


government of Kim Jong Il was bluffing or had succeeded in


producing the material undetected.





Officials said today that the answer was unclear. A


preliminary set of atmospheric tests for the presence of a


gas given off as nuclear waste is reprocessed into plutonium


is the best indicator the United States has from one of the


world's most closed nations. The most recent tests suggested


that nuclear work has accelerated, but the results were


inconclusive. More test results are expected at the end of


this week.





"It's the mirror image of the Iraq problem," one official


said. "We spent years looking for evidence Iraq was lying


when it said it didn't have a nuclear program. Now North


Korea says it's about to go nuclear, and everyone is trying


to figure out whether they've finally done it, or if it's


the big lie."





North Korea boasted in April that it was working to convert


its 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods into weapons-grade


plutonium. The rods had been held under seal by


international inspectors until the inspectors were expelled


from the country on Dec. 31. Several months ago, American


spy satellites saw the rods being hauled away from a storage


shed, though it is unclear where they were taken.





North Korea's latest declaration, if true, would pose a


direct challenge to President Bush, who said two months ago


that a nuclear-armed North Korea "will not be tolerated."





Mr. Bush will be faced with difficult choices. Early this


year, he decided it was too risky to take military action


against the North's main nuclear reprocessing plant, at


Yongbyon, even before the reprocessing started. Now, though,


the Pentagon may be asked to revisit the military options


that Mr. Bush has always said are a last resort.





But the president must also decide whether to negotiate with


the North - under its implicit nuclear threat - or hold fast


to his insistence that any talks must include other regional


nations, and that nuclear blackmail would be met with


increasingly harsh sanctions.





In the months since the spent nuclear fuel rods were


transported to an unknown location, North Korea has


regularly escalated its claims. First, it said it needed


a "strong physical deterrent" to protect itself against


invasion by the United States. Then, after the Iraq war, it


said it needed a "nuclear deterrent."





But intelligence agencies have scant evidence that North


Korea has produced enough plutonium to build a nuclear


weapon, officials said. As recently as two weeks ago,


American intelligence officials told South Korea and Japan


that they believed that, at most, only a few hundred rods


had been converted into weapons-usable material. Then they


warned that the North was experimenting with the


conventional explosives needed to ignite a nuclear


explosion - further evidence of intent to produce weapons.





The C.I.A. believes that North Korea may have produced two


nuclear weapons in the early 1990's, but the evidence is in


dispute. In any event, officials say the ability to produce


a half-dozen more would greatly increase the North's


leverage: it could conduct a nuclear test, store a few


weapons and threaten to sell any leftover plutonium.





The North's latest declaration came on Tuesday in New York,


during an unannounced meeting between North Korean diplomats


at the United Nations and Jack Pritchard, a State Department


official who handles North Korea issues.





"They went into new territory," said one official familiar


with the meeting. The North Korean diplomats read a


statement from Pyongyang declaring that the reprocessing of


the rods, a chemical process that the North perfected in the


late 1980's after receiving considerable foreign help, had


been completed on June 30.





The North Koreans then said weapons production was


beginning. "They didn't say how long it would take, and they


didn't threaten to sell anything," a senior official said.





The State Department spokesman, Richard A. Boucher, said


today that "North Korea has made a variety of claims" in the


past, some false.





"We've always said that we will look at all of the available


information, not just what they happen to claim or say at


any given moment," he said.





Despite the effort to play down the news - Mr. Bush's aides


have refused to call the Korea situation a "crisis," fearing


that would play into Mr. Kim's strategy - there is a debate


in the administration about North Korea's intentions.





Some see last week's declaration as a negotiating ploy. They


believe that North Korea has been frustrated by Mr. Bush's


refusal to engage in one-on-one negotiations, insisting


instead that China, Japan and South Korea act as partners in


finding a regional solution. Mr. Bush's real motivation for


resisting bilateral talks, his aides say, is that he fears


that Asian nations will press the United States to reach


some kind of deal similar to the one the Clinton


administration signed - a "freeze" on nuclear activity in


return for aid.





Other officials believe that Mr. Kim's government has simply


decided that it can make both Washington and its Asian


neighbors accept North Korea as a new nuclear power.





"There's a body of thought that they are just getting


everybody accustomed to the idea," a senior administration


official said. "So when they say one day, `We've gone


nuclear,' it's no shock."





China Sends Letter to Kim





SEOUL, South Korea, Tuesday, July 15 (Reuters) - President


Hu Jintao of China has sent a letter to Mr. Kim, the North


Korean leader, and South Korea said today that it hoped that


the message would help persuade Pyongyang to agree to


multilateral talks on its nuclear aims.





KCNA, the North's official news agency, said China's deputy


foreign minister, Dai Bingguo, met Mr. Kim on Monday. KCNA


did not disclose the substance of the letter.





http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/15/international/asia/15KORE.html














C. 美, 경수로 9월초 철수…사실상 사업중단





동아일보 2003년 7월15일 06:38





경수로 건설 사업을 위해 설립된 한반도에너지개발기구(KEDO)의 북한 금호사무소(신포 지구 소재) 미국 대표가 9월 초에 철수할 예정이라고 미국의 정보 소식통이 13일 밝혔다.





이 소식통은 “미국은 이미 4월 경수로 건설사업에 더 이상 참여하지 않기로 결정했다”며 “금호사무소의 미국 대표 철수는 사실상 경수로 사업의 중단으로 이어질 것”이라고 말했다.





그는 “미국 대표는 8월 말까지 철수 준비를 끝낸 뒤 곧 철수할 것이며 이어 일본 대표도 철수하게 될 것으로 안다”면서 “미국은 8월 이후 사무소 운영예산도 배정해 놓지 않은 것으로 안다”고 덧붙였다.





금호사무소에는 한미일 3국 대표를 포함해 6명이 근무 중이며 3국 대표간 협의로 의사 결정을 해왔다. 미국 대표가 철수하면 의사 결정이 이뤄질 수 없게 돼 사업이 중단될 수밖에 없는 만큼 북한측의 반발이 예상된다.





하지만 미국이 한미일 유럽연합(EU)으로 구성된 KEDO 집행이사국에서도 탈퇴해 경수로 공사를 완전히 종료시킬 것인지는 아직 분명하지 않은 것으로 알려졌다.





한미일 3국은 지난달 13일 하와이에서 열린 대북정책조정감독그룹(TCOG) 회의와 2, 3일 워싱턴에서 열린 한미일 북핵 정책협의회 등에서 사업 중단여부를 논의했으나 한국과 미국의 입장 차이로 결론을 내리지 못했다.





당시 한국은 경수로 건설의 공정 변경과 속도 조절을 통해 사업을 계속 유지하자는 입장이었으나 미국은 중단을 요구했고 일본의 입장은 일시 중단이었던 것으로 알려졌다.





그러나 3국은 경수로 핵심 부품에 대한 라이선스를 모두 미국 기업이 갖고 있는 만큼 미-북간 원자력 협정이 체결되지 않으면 경수로 건설이 중단될 수밖에 없다는 데 인식을 같이했다.





KEDO는 1994년 북-미간 제네바 기본합의에 따라 북한에 중유를 제공하고 경수로 2기를 건설해주기 위해 설립된 기구. 97년 8월 공사에 들어간 경수로 1호기는 6월 말 현재 공정의 31.1%가 진행됐으며 12억2300만달러가 들어갔다.





워싱턴=권순택 특파원 maypole@donga.com














(끝)