Fire Agency: Wando Firefighter Deaths Caused by Lack of Hazard Information and Poor Command

An investigation has concluded that the deaths of two firefighters in a cold storage warehouse fire in Wando, South Jeolla Province, this past April were the result of a combination of factors, including a failure to properly share hazard information about the building and inadequate on-site command and response systems.

The National Fire Agency announced the results of an investigation conducted by a joint task force, which included external experts and representatives from firefighter unions, along with measures to prevent a recurrence.

The task force conducted a comprehensive 30-day investigation starting April 20, covering the cause of the fire, the circumstances of the fatalities, fire demonstration experiments, and on-site response and safety management.

The investigation confirmed that the fire began on the morning of April 12 at a cold storage warehouse in Wando-gun, South Jeolla Province, when sparks from a worker using an LP gas torch to remove floor epoxy ignited urethane foam behind the wall panels.

Because the interior of the warehouse was a sealed structure with no windows or openings, flammable gases generated by the thermal decomposition of the urethane foam accumulated in the ceiling. It is believed that a "Fire Gas Ignition (FGI)" phenomenon occurred when these gases ignited as the fire spread.

Fire crews dispatched after receiving the report carried out an interior-focused suppression operation, cutting through wall panels to locate the source of the fire. However, at 8:53 a.m., flames were spotted in the upper left corner of the ceiling, and an order was issued for the firefighters to evacuate.

Of the seven firefighters inside at the time, five managed to escape, but Fire Lieutenant Park Seung-won (Wando Rescue Team) and Firefighter Noh Tae-young (Haenam Fire Station, Bukpyeong Sub-station) were unable to get out and died in the line of duty.

The task force identified the lack of hazard information regarding the building—specifically, the failure to inform responding crews that the walls were finished with urethane foam—as a primary cause of the accident.

Other factors cited included the omission of formal command transfer procedures, insufficient situational assessment and tactical decision-making, the absence of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for special fires involving materials like urethane foam, inadequate operation of the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT), poor maintenance of safety equipment such as thermal imaging cameras, an over-reliance on sending firefighters directly into high-risk areas, and a shortage of suppression personnel on pump trucks.

Based on the investigation, the National Fire Agency plans to improve its 119 situation control system to provide real-time hazard, strategic, and tactical information to responding crews. It will also strengthen training for dispatch personnel and enhance education on responding to high-risk special fires involving materials like urethane foam.

The agency intends to supplement standard procedures to ensure that the first arriving officer and the command team clearly declare command authority immediately upon arrival and systematically perform situational assessments and tactical decisions.

For fires where there is no possibility of saving lives, defensive suppression strategies will be prioritized. The formation and operation of a Rapid Intervention Team will be made mandatory at high-risk fire scenes, such as warehouses with urethane foam.

To reduce the need for firefighters to enter high-risk areas directly, the agency will expand the deployment of unmanned firefighting robots.

The agency plans to review the field utility of the unmanned firefighting robots currently being piloted and push for additional distribution, while also strengthening the management of essential safety equipment such as thermal imaging cameras.

Additionally, the agency plans to gradually increase the number of essential on-site personnel, including suppression crews on pump trucks, by approximately 5,000 over five years from 2026 to 2030, and redistribute them based on regional disaster risk levels.

Choi Yong-cheol, Acting Commissioner of the National Fire Agency, stated, "As we have thoroughly examined the areas that did not function properly on-site through this joint investigation, we will prioritize improvements that can be implemented immediately to ensure such an accident is not repeated, and we will carry out mid-to-long-term tasks without setbacks."

(Photo: Provided by Jeonnam Fire Headquarters, Yonhap News)
※ Please note: This article was translated by AI and may contain errors.