News

"Can't Take It Anymore": How the 'World's Mightiest' Crumbled, and the Real Problem Beneath

"240 Days Straight at Sea, Mold and Broken Toilets": How the USS Lincoln Crisis Exposed the U.S. Navy's Structural Breakdown

"Can't Take It Anymore": How the 'World's Mightiest' Crumbled, and the Real Problem Beneath
안내

We only offer this video
to viewers located within Korea
(해당 영상은 해외에서 재생이 불가합니다)

⚡ Key Summary

The Cost of a 240-Day Nonstop Deployment: As the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln remained deployed for roughly nine months, reports emerged of food shortages, deteriorating sanitation, and suicide attempts among the crew.

An Irreplaceable Carrier Fleet: Although the U.S. Navy is legally mandated to maintain 11 aircraft carriers, maintenance delays and personnel shortages leave only two to three ships deployable simultaneously, creating a carrier vacuum in the Western Pacific while relieving the Lincoln.

Signs of the Carrier-Centric Era's End: With advances in drone and missile technology increasing the vulnerability of large aircraft carriers, the U.S. Navy leadership is contemplating a shift toward a distributed, network-centric force structure.

1. "Sailors Jumping into the Sea" - The Crisis Brought by a Nine-Month Deployment

In early August 2026, a sailor jumped overboard from the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72). While the sailor was fortunately rescued by a helicopter, this was merely the tip of the iceberg. U.S. military news outlets Navy Times and Stars and Stripes reported that several crew members had attempted suicide. The Lincoln departed San Diego in November 2025 and was originally scheduled to return in May 2026. However, its deployment was extended to support the war with Iran, keeping it at sea for nearly nine months—including 240 consecutive days without a single port call.

Citing accounts from sailors' families and anonymous crew members, The Guardian and CBS News reported on "food and supply shortages, broken toilets, moldy showers, contaminated water, and disruptions to the mail system and care package deliveries." One crew member stated, "We used to be able to buy as many hygiene products as we wanted at the ship's store, but now purchases are restricted, and hygiene items are virtually out of stock." At a town hall meeting held on August 6 at Naval Base Coronado on North Island in San Diego, about 200 family members gathered to demand answers from Navy leadership.

2. Democratic Inquiry vs. Trump's "Not Even Long Enough"

On August 12, Democratic lawmakers led by Senator Richard Blumenthal sent a formal inquiry to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao. The inquiry questioned "the circumstances surrounding the deployment extension, issues regarding hygiene, supplies, and living quarters, metrics assessing fatigue, morale, and mental health, counts of safety incidents, medical problems, and disciplinary actions, and whether current carrier demand exceeds the Navy's sustainable operational limits." Senator Blumenthal emphasized, "The Lincoln's extended deployment is particularly grave given the possibility of a prolonged war with Iran."

However, President Donald Trump's response was cold. When reporters asked on August 14 whether the deployment was too long, Trump answered, "No. No. No. It's not long at all. In fact, it's not even long enough." Secretary Hegseth also dismissed the reports, claiming "the situation has been completely distorted," and stressed, "We provide every ship, every sailor, and every commanding officer with everything we can offer at every single moment." A Navy spokesperson stated that "no increase in suicidal ideations or attempts has been observed aboard the Lincoln," but declined to provide specific data, citing operational security and patient privacy.

3. Maintenance Delays and Shipyard Bottlenecks - No Carrier to Relieve

The war was not the sole reason the Lincoln remained stranded at sea for nine months. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the U.S. Navy is legally required to maintain 11 aircraft carriers. However, experts cited by the Associated Press analyze that typically only two to three carriers can be deployed at any given time. The rest are undergoing maintenance, conducting crew training, or both. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) revealed that across fiscal years 2015 to 2019, 75 percent of carrier and submarine maintenance plans were completed with delays, with carriers experiencing an average delay of 113 days. The primary causes were unexpected additional work discovered after planning and shortages in shipyard workforce and capacity.

The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) also acknowledged that its four public shipyards are inefficient at maintaining and modernizing nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines due to aging facilities. Bryan Clark, a defense analyst at the Hudson Institute, warned in an interview with AP, "We are going to have to pay a 'maintenance debt' over the next several years," adding that "carriers will be lined up at the shipyards." In other words, the Lincoln's prolonged stay at sea is not merely an operational decision on the front lines, but a textbook case where structural weaknesses in rear maintenance infrastructure forced an extension of forward operational duration.

4. The Western Pacific Vacuum and the "Signal" Sent to China

To relieve the Lincoln, the USS George Washington headed to the Middle East, leaving the Western Pacific without a U.S. aircraft carrier for a period of time. The George Washington had been the only forward-deployed U.S. carrier stationed in Yokosuka, Japan, since November 2024. AP cited analysts reporting that "while China may not invade Taiwan immediately, it has created an opportunity to signal to regional allies that the United States is no longer always on the scene."

Greg Poling, director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), pointed out, "The Trump administration says the Pacific is second in priority only to the Western Hemisphere, but in reality, they are doing the exact opposite," noting that "they are moving counter to the goal of pulling out of the Middle East." China continues its exercises and pressure in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and CSIS missile threat data outlines how China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) doctrine has evolved to target U.S. carriers and forward bases with ballistic and cruise missiles. In short, U.S. aircraft carriers are far from being "dispensable symbols"—they remain vital visual and political deterrents, yet they are increasingly becoming high-value, high-vulnerability assets.

The carrier vacuum in the Western Pacific caused by the U.S. Navy's force overextension carries direct repercussions for the security landscape in Northeast Asia. In the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, the rapid deployment of U.S. naval reinforcements could face setbacks. This serves as a decisive catalyst compelling regional allies, including South Korea, to move beyond relying solely on the U.S. umbrella and accelerate efforts to bolster their own maritime defense capabilities and multilayered missile defense systems.

5. "Carriers Are No Longer the Sole Linchpin" - Redesigning the Future Battlefield

Michael Swaine of the Quincy Institute pointed out that "as drone and missile technologies advance, aircraft carriers can be targeted more easily." AP reported that senior U.S. Navy officials conveyed a desire to "persuade commanders to utilize smaller, newer ships and other assets instead of carriers." This does not mean aircraft carriers will disappear; rather, carriers must transition from being the sole linchpin to becoming one component among multiple networked strike, reconnaissance, and command assets.

The U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings and related defense discussions have repeatedly advocated for distributed maritime operations, uncrewed aircraft-centric future carrier air wings, and reducing reliance on large carrier strike groups. The Lincoln situation illustrates the friction that occurs when the legacy carrier-centric model attempts to absorb high operational demands before that transition has sufficiently materialized. The deteriorating conditions for sailors are merely a symptom; the real disease is the structural overload of the U.S. Navy.

6. Mental Health as a Component of Combat Readiness

Looking at the questions lawmakers posed to the Navy, the focus extends far beyond whether "life on board was uncomfortable." The letter collectively demanded metrics on fatigue, morale, mental health, safety incidents, medical problems, disciplinary issues, and readiness. This signifies that the U.S. Congress already views this matter not merely as a humanitarian concern, but as an issue directly tied to combat efficiency and accident risk. According to the Defense Health Agency (DHA) website Health.mil, DHA4 and DHA5 mental health assessments are conducted on service members deployed for 30 days or longer, with the explicit goal of identifying PTSD and other behavioral health issues to ensure individual and unit readiness. In other words, the U.S. military system itself has institutionalized mental health as part of combat readiness.

Prior research points to the same conclusion. Studies examining deployed U.S. Navy personnel have highlighted the failure to identify individuals showing pre-deployment warning signs of PTSD and depression early on, as well as significant correlations between stress, sleep, and depressive symptoms before, during, and after deployment. More recent qualitative research summaries also identify unpredictability, disconnection from family, lack of recovery opportunities, and physical and emotional exhaustion as core burdens of maritime deployments. Therefore, the Lincoln crisis is not an anomalous deviation, but a real-world manifestation of existing research on how prolonged sea deployments degrade crew functionality.

7. The Lincoln Will Return, but the Problem Will Recur

The Lincoln is scheduled to return soon after mid-August. However, the same problem is highly likely to recur with the next carrier, and the one after that. Unless the bottlenecks in maintenance infrastructure and the personnel pipeline are resolved, the shortage of operational carriers will persist, and forward deployment durations will inevitably stretch again. Congressional hearings repeatedly raise concerns over approximately 20,000 gapped sea billets, and the GAO views maintenance delays and shipyard capacity shortages as an enduring structural problem.

The essence of this situation is not simply "worsening conditions for service members." More precisely, the deteriorating conditions for sailors are an event that has brought the structural overload of the carrier operational system to light. As the war drags on, aircraft carriers do not just stay at sea longer—they simultaneously bring about maintenance cycle strains, crew burnout, an Indo-Pacific vacuum, allied anxiety, and debates over relevance on the future battlefield. The structural vulnerabilities that the U.S. Navy has accumulated since the Cold War have now been exposed under the pressure of war. That moment is now.


Deep Dive Q&A
Q1. Why can the U.S. Navy deploy only two to three carriers despite having 11 in its fleet?

A. Because aircraft carriers operate on a cyclical rotation of deployment, maintenance, and training. Typically, when one carrier is deployed, another is undergoing maintenance, and another is conducting crew training. The problem is that maintenance is delayed by an average of 113 days beyond schedule, and shipyard labor and facility shortages are exacerbating bottlenecks. Ultimately, the "number of ships owned" is not synonymous with the "number of ships immediately deployable." When the window for relief is missed, as happened with the Lincoln, deployment durations stretch indefinitely.

Q2. Will the USS Lincoln crisis affect South Korea's security?

A. While direct impacts may be limited, the carrier vacuum in the Western Pacific creates an impression among regional allies, including South Korea, that U.S. priorities are once again tied down in the Middle East. China continues military drills and pressure in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and the absence of a U.S. carrier provides Beijing with an opening for psychological and political warfare. Furthermore, the operational limits of the U.S. Navy's carrier fleet serve as a clear signal for allies, including South Korea, to think more seriously about strengthening their own naval capabilities and establishing multilayered defense systems.

Q3. If the carrier-centric model changes, what will the future naval force look like?

A. U.S. Navy leadership and defense experts point toward "Distributed Maritime Operations" and uncrewed network-centric forces. Rather than disappearing entirely, aircraft carriers will no longer serve as the sole linchpin, but will instead become one of many strike, reconnaissance, and command assets. Drones, smaller surface combatants, submarines, and missile platforms will be networked together to form a distributed force, with the aircraft carrier operating as a single node in that network. This approach aims to move high-value, high-vulnerability carriers out of the enemy's crosshairs while enhancing the flexibility and survivability of the entire force.
※ Please note: This article was translated by AI and may contain errors.
Copyright Ⓒ SBS. All rights reserved. 무단 전재, 재배포 및 AI학습 이용 금지

Most Read