Buying Trillions in Weapons for an 'Expensive Shield'? The Secret Behind 'Who Will Fight'

The war between the U.S., Israel, and Iran, which raged until this past May, left several Gulf Arab nations, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, caught in the crossfire. Despite hosting U.S. military bases, these countries faced thousands of missile and drone attacks from Iran. Interestingly, while they managed to intercept most of the incoming attacks, they did not independently retaliate against Iran. They essentially stood behind the U.S. and Israel, holding up only a shield. We often see news about the UAE purchasing weapons from South Korea or Saudi Arabia receiving military aid from the U.S. Yet, why do these nations, despite stockpiling so many weapons, only take hits without mounting a proper counterattack? Could it be that they do not even trust their own military capabilities?

1. It Is Not That They Are Not Spending Money, But Where Are They Spending It?
It is not that Middle Eastern countries are not spending money on defense. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden, the ratio of defense spending to GDP in 2023 was 8.9% for Lebanon, 7.1% for Saudi Arabia, and around 5% for Oman. The UAE does not disclose its statistics, but as of its last report in 2014, it also exceeded 5%. The global average is 2.3%, so most Arab nations far exceed this. Considering that South Korea, which is still technically in a state of armistice, spends about 2.8%, you can see how high these figures are. The problem is "where" they spend it. The British magazine The Economist pointed out that these countries are wasting money on what could be called "useless" weapons—pouring funds into armaments they do not actually need.

Experts diagnose the situation this way: Arab nations should be preparing for "asymmetric threats," but they are only purchasing weapons for all-out warfare. Asymmetric threats refer to methods that aim for significant impact with low costs, such as drones, ballistic missiles, and cyberattacks. Given the geography and international situation of the Arab region, analysts suggest that the most likely form of conflict these countries will face is not a full-scale war between regular armies, but precisely this type of engagement. This has been the case in reality; Arab nations have mostly suffered from localized conflicts since the last Middle East war in the 1970s.

Even recently, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been struggling with guerrilla-style attacks from Houthi rebels, and the recent Iranian attack was also a classic asymmetric strike led by drones and missiles. Therefore, experts point out that to counter such threats, they should increase their naval power and acquire "cost-effective" weapons like drones, yet they pour their budgets into flashy equipment like fighter jets. In fact, looking at the foreign weapons Saudi Arabia has purchased over the past decade, the proportion of fighter jets has been significant.

[Mohammed bin Salman / Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (November last year): We are going to announce that we will increase our investment from $600 billion to nearly $1 trillion, which will create real investment and genuine opportunities across various sectors.]

Since 2017, Qatar has spent $25 billion, or approximately 34 trillion won, to purchase 96 state-of-the-art fighter jets. Consequently, their "cost-effectiveness" in actual combat drops significantly. During the recent war, Iran poured a total of about 2,000 drones toward the UAE alone. The problem is that to block these cheap drones, the UAE had to keep firing much more expensive interceptor missiles. It was a losing business, using an expensive shield to block cheap attacks. As a result, it is estimated that the UAE exhausted about 75% of its Patriot missile inventory during this war. It reached a point where a large transport aircraft flew all the way to Daegu, South Korea, to urgently load interceptor missiles for the Cheongung-II. For reference, the Cheongung-II made its presence felt in this war by intercepting 96% of targets at one-third the cost of the U.S. Patriot system.

2. So Many Weapons, What Is the Real Strategy?
Then why do Arab countries spend such large sums of money on inefficient weapons? First, apart from Israel, Middle Eastern countries lack the technology to produce weapons themselves. In fact, according to international arms transfer statistics, the Middle East accounted for 30% of global arms imports from 2019 to 2023, ranking second after Asia and Oceania. However, some analyses suggest there is a hidden motive. A U.S. think tank observed that these countries judge it more efficient to secure "protection promises" from major powers like the U.S. rather than building up their own defense capabilities. They are not buying weapons out of military necessity, but spending money as a diplomatic card with Western powers.

A prime example is the aforementioned Qatar. At the time, Qatar was secretly supporting Islamic militant groups like Hamas to increase its influence in the Middle East. When this was revealed, it faced pressure from neighboring Arab countries, including a severance of diplomatic ties and trade sanctions. Cornered, Qatar purchased U.S. F-15s, British Eurofighter Typhoons, and French Rafales, effectively sending a signal to major powers to "help us." This "courtship of major powers" has continued until recently. Last year, Qatar even handed over a Boeing 747 jumbo jet worth $400 million, or about 550 billion won, for President Trump to use as his private plane.

[Donald Trump / President of the United States: I asked the Emir (of Qatar). I asked if we could use one of his new 747s. I wanted to use it for a little while. Our planes are too old.]

The reason Middle Eastern countries are buying many of our weapons these days has a similar context. While the U.S. and Europe are diplomatically important, they attach complex political and diplomatic conditions when selling weapons, which is a burden for the Middle East. On the other hand, they calculate that dealing with South Korea carries fewer such political burdens and offers much better performance for the price.

[Shin Jong-woo / Secretary General of the Korea Defense and Security Forum: In the case of U.S. Patriot missiles, they fire two missiles per target. If one of them hits, it is considered a success. However, when the Cheongung-II underwent acceptance testing in the UAE last year, it was done under the condition of succeeding with one shot per target. Simply put, it is one shot, one kill, 100%.]

The very fact that they possess world-recognized South Korean weapons also serves as a deterrent, making them difficult to provoke lightly.

3. A Mountain of Weapons, But No Army to Fight?
For leaders in monarchies or authoritarian regimes, a military that becomes too powerful is actually a burden, as they never know when those guns might be turned against them. Therefore, these countries maintain separate elite guards to protect the royal family, apart from the regular army. Professor Andreas Krieg of King's College London points out that in the Arab world, the military and the elite guards are often separated, and in some countries, the size of the elite guard is even larger than that of the regular army.

In fact, the Saudi Arabian National Guard is known to have 130,000 personnel and is effectively treated as a unit for royal protection. In Egypt, the military operates like a massive corporate conglomerate, extending its reach into everything from resorts to construction companies. Even Jordan, which has some semblance of defense capability, relies on mercenaries brought in from abroad for a significant portion of its core military personnel. The UAE also entrusts its presidential guard and special forces to Western foreign officers and advisors.

This leads to the criticism that no matter how many weapons they have, there is a shortage of "people" to actually fight for the country. Looking at the UAE, 90% of its 11 million population are foreigners. While the military is said to have 65,000 active-duty personnel and 130,000 reservists, it is known that a significant number are foreign technical and support staff. If a country goes to war relying on mercenary-centered units instead of a force united by patriotism, it is unlikely that the war will be conducted properly.

4. Can the Oil-Rich Nations Change?
Of course, the atmosphere in Arab countries has been changing recently. Saudi Arabia has set a goal to produce more than half of its weapons domestically by 2030, and the UAE is also accelerating the localization of weapons by merging its state-owned defense companies. However, if inefficient defense spending and the current political systems remain unchanged, these efforts may end up being nothing more than "pouring water into a bottomless pit."

(Reported by Kim Jiuk | Produced by Shin Hee-sook | Video by Park Woo-jin, Hwang Se-hoe | Video Editing by Ahn Jun-hyeok | Graphics by Lee Soo-min, Yang Hye-min | Produced by SBS Digital News | Source: DVIDS, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Saudi Ministry of Defense, EDGE)
※ Please note: This article was translated by AI and may contain errors.