Why Travel to Daegu for Missiles? The Secret Behind the Desert Armies' 'Wasted Spending' [Global Insight]

The war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, which raged until last May, left several countries in a difficult position despite their efforts to remain on the sidelines. These nations, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, are Gulf Arab states that found themselves under attack by thousands of Iranian missiles and drones simply because they host U.S. military bases. Interestingly, however, their response was limited. While they managed to intercept most of the incoming attacks, they did not launch independent counterstrikes against Iran. They essentially stood behind the U.S. and Israel, acting only as a shield. We often see news about the UAE purchasing weapons from South Korea or Saudi Arabia receiving military aid from the U.S. Why, then, despite stockpiling so many weapons, were they only able to take hits without mounting a proper counterattack? Could it be that they do not trust their own military power?

1. It Is Not That They Are Not Spending Money—So Where Does It Go?

First, let us clarify one point: it is not that Middle Eastern countries are not spending on defense. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden, the ratio of defense spending to GDP in 2023 was 8.9% for Lebanon, 7.1% for Saudi Arabia, and around 5% for Oman. The UAE does not disclose its statistics, but as of 2014, the last year for which data was available, it also exceeded 5%. The global average is 2.3%, so most Arab nations far exceed this figure. Considering that South Korea, which is still technically in a state of armistice, spends about 2.8%, you can see how high these numbers are. The problem is where they spend it. The Economist pointed out that these countries are essentially wasting money—in other words, pouring funds into weapons they do not actually need.

Experts diagnose the situation as follows: Arab nations should be preparing for asymmetric threats, but they are only purchasing weapons designed for all-out war. Asymmetric threats refer to methods that aim for maximum impact at a low cost, such as drones, ballistic missiles, and cyberattacks. Given the geography of the Arab region and the international political landscape, analysts argue that the most likely form of conflict these countries will face is not a full-scale war between regular armies, but rather these types of disputes. This has been the reality; since the last Middle East war in the 1970s, most Arab nations have been plagued by localized conflicts.

Even recently, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been struggling with guerrilla-style attacks from Houthi rebels, and the recent Iranian attack was a classic asymmetric strike led by drones and missiles. Therefore, experts point out that to counter such threats, they should strengthen their naval forces and acquire cost-effective weapons like drones, yet they continue to pour budgets into flashy weapons like fighter jets. In fact, looking at the foreign weapons Saudi Arabia has purchased over the past decade, the proportion of fighter jets has been significant.

[Mohammed bin Salman / Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (November last year): We are planning to announce an increase in investment from 600 billion dollars to nearly 1 trillion dollars, which will create real investments and genuine opportunities across various sectors.]

Since 2017, Qatar has spent 25 billion dollars—approximately 34 trillion Korean won—to purchase 96 state-of-the-art fighter jets. Consequently, cost-effectiveness in actual combat drops significantly. During the recent war, Iran launched a total of 2,000 drones at the UAE alone. The problem was that the UAE had to keep firing much more expensive interceptor missiles to stop these cheap drones. It was a losing battle, using an expensive shield to block a cheap attack. As a result, it is estimated that the UAE exhausted about 75% of its Patriot missile inventory during this war. It reached a point where a large transport aircraft flew all the way to Daegu, South Korea, to urgently load interceptor missiles for the Cheongung-II. For reference, the Cheongung-II solidified its presence in this war by achieving a 96% interception rate at one-third the cost of the U.S. Patriot system.

2. So Many Weapons—What Is the Real Strategy?

Why, then, do Arab nations spend such large sums on inefficient weapons? First, with the exception of Israel, Middle Eastern countries lack the technology to produce weapons themselves. In fact, international arms transfer data shows that from 2019 to 2023, the Middle East accounted for 30% of global arms imports, ranking second after Asia and Oceania. However, some analysts suggest there is a hidden motive. A U.S. think tank observed that these countries judge it more efficient to secure protection promises from major powers like the U.S. rather than building their own defense capabilities. They are not buying weapons out of military necessity, but rather spending money as a diplomatic card to engage with Western powers.

A prime example is Qatar, mentioned earlier. At the time, Qatar was secretly supporting Islamic militant groups like Hamas to expand its influence in the Middle East. When this was revealed, it faced pressure from neighboring Arab countries, including a severance of diplomatic ties and trade sanctions. Cornered, Qatar purchased U.S. F-15s, British Eurofighter Typhoons, and French Rafales, effectively signaling to major powers to help them. This courtship of major powers has continued until recently. Last year, Qatar even handed over a 400 million dollar—approximately 550 billion Korean won—Boeing 747 jumbo jet to President Trump, telling him to use it as his private plane.

[Donald Trump / President of the United States: I asked the Emir (the ruler of Qatar). I asked if we could use his new 747. I wanted to use it for a bit. Our planes are too old.]

The reason Middle Eastern countries are buying many of our weapons lately follows a similar logic. While the U.S. and Europe are diplomatically important, they attach complex political and diplomatic conditions when selling weapons, which is a burden for the Middle East. On the other hand, they calculate that dealing with South Korea carries less political baggage and offers much better performance for the price.

[Shin Jong-woo / Secretary General of the Korea Defense and Security Forum: In the case of U.S. Patriot missiles, they fire two missiles per target. It is considered a hit if one of them connects. However, when the Cheongung-II underwent acceptance testing in the UAE last year, it was done under the condition of succeeding with one shot per target. Simply put, it is one shot, one kill—100%.]

The very fact that they possess South Korean weapons, which are recognized globally, also acts as a deterrent, making it difficult for others to provoke them lightly.

3. Piles of Weapons, But No Army to Fight?

There is one more reason why the defense capabilities of Arab nations are weak: their political systems. For leaders in monarchies or authoritarian regimes, a military that becomes too strong is a burden, as they never know when those guns might be turned against them. Therefore, these countries maintain separate elite units to protect the royal family, distinct from the regular army. Professor Andreas Krieg of King's College London points out that in the Arab world, the military and elite guard units are often separated, and in some countries, the size of the elite guard is even larger than the regular army.

In fact, Saudi Arabia's National Guard, known to have 130,000 personnel, is essentially considered a unit for royal protection. In Egypt, the military operates like a massive conglomerate, with its hands in everything from resorts to construction companies. Even Jordan, which is considered to have some military capability, relies on mercenaries from abroad for a significant portion of its core military personnel. The UAE also entrusts its presidential guard and special forces to Western foreign officers and advisors.

This leads to the criticism that no matter how many weapons they have, there is a lack of people to fight for the country. In the UAE alone, 90% of the 11 million population are foreigners. While they are said to have 65,000 active-duty troops and 130,000 reservists, it is known that a significant number are foreign nationals serving in technical and support roles. If a country goes to war with a mercenary-centered force when it should be fighting a total war united by patriotism, the war is unlikely to go well.

4. Can the Oil-Rich Nations Change?

Of course, the atmosphere in Arab countries has been changing recently. Saudi Arabia has set a goal to produce more than half of its weapon imports domestically by 2030, and the UAE is also accelerating the localization of weapons by merging its state-owned defense companies. However, if inefficient defense spending and the current political systems remain unchanged, these efforts may end up being nothing more than pouring water into a bottomless pit.

Reported by Kim Jiuk | Produced by Shin Hee-sook | Video by Park Woo-jin and Hwang Se-hoe | Video Editing by Ahn Jun-hyeok | Graphics by Lee Soo-min and Yang Hye-min | Produced by SBS Digital News | Source: DVIDS, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Saudi Ministry of Defense, EDGE
※ Please note: This article was translated by AI and may contain errors.