The war between the U.S., Israel, and Iran, which raged until this past May, left several countries in the Gulf region—such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia—caught in the crossfire. These nations faced thousands of missile and drone attacks from Iran simply because they host U.S. military bases. Interestingly, however, their response was limited. While they managed to intercept most of the incoming attacks, they did not launch independent counterstrikes against Iran. They essentially stood behind the U.S. and Israel, acting only as a shield.

We often see news about the UAE purchasing weapons from South Korea or Saudi Arabia receiving military aid from the U.S. Given their massive stockpiles of weaponry, why were they unable to mount a proper counterattack? Perhaps they could not even trust their own military capabilities.

1. It Is Not About Lack of Spending, But Where It Is Spent

First, let us clarify one point: it is not that these Middle Eastern countries are not spending on defense. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden, the 2023 defense spending as a percentage of GDP was 8.9% for Lebanon, 7.1% for Saudi Arabia, and around 5% for Oman. While the UAE does not disclose its statistics, its last reported figure in 2014 was also above 5%. These figures far exceed the global average of 2.3%. Considering that South Korea, which remains in a state of armistice, spends about 2.8%, one can see how high these numbers are. The problem lies in "where" the money is spent. The Economist pointed out that these countries are essentially "wasting money"—pouring funds into weapons they do not actually need.

Experts diagnose the situation as follows: Arab nations should be preparing for "asymmetric threats," yet they are only purchasing weapons designed for all-out conventional warfare. Asymmetric threats refer to tactics that aim for high impact at a low cost, such as drones, ballistic missiles, and cyberattacks. Given the geography and international situation of the Arab region, analysts argue that the most likely form of conflict is not a full-scale war between regular armies, but these types of disputes. This has been the case since the last Middle East war in the 1970s, with Arab nations mostly suffering from localized conflicts.

Even recently, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have struggled with guerrilla-style attacks from Houthi rebels, and the recent Iranian attack was a classic asymmetric strike using drones and missiles. Experts point out that to counter such threats, these countries should strengthen their naval forces and acquire cost-effective weapons like drones. Instead, they pour their budgets into flashy equipment like fighter jets. In fact, fighter jets have accounted for a significant portion of Saudi Arabia's foreign weapon purchases over the past decade.

[Mohammed bin Salman / Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (November of last year): We are planning to announce an increase in investment from $600 billion to nearly $1 trillion, which will create real investments and genuine opportunities across various sectors.]

Since 2017, Qatar has spent $25 billion (approximately 34 trillion KRW) to purchase 96 state-of-the-art fighter jets. As a result, the cost-effectiveness in actual combat is extremely low. During the recent war, Iran launched a total of 2,000 drones against the UAE alone. The problem was that the UAE had to fire much more expensive interceptor missiles to stop these cheap drones. It was a losing trade, using an expensive shield to block a cheap attack. Consequently, it is estimated that the UAE exhausted about 75% of its Patriot missile stockpile during this war. The situation was so dire that a large transport plane flew all the way to Daegu, South Korea, to urgently load interceptor missiles for the Cheongung-II system. For reference, the Cheongung-II, which costs one-third of the U.S. Patriot, solidified its reputation in this war by intercepting 96% of targets.

2. With So Many Weapons, What Is the Real Strategy?

Why do Arab nations spend so much money on inefficient weapons? First, with the exception of Israel, Middle Eastern countries lack the technology to produce their own weapons. International arms transfer data shows that from 2019 to 2023, the Middle East accounted for 30% of global arms imports, ranking second after Asia and Oceania. However, some analysts suggest there is a hidden motive. A U.S. think tank observed that these countries find it more efficient to secure "protection promises" from major powers like the U.S. than to build up their own defense capabilities. They are not buying weapons out of military necessity, but rather using the money as a diplomatic card to engage with Western powers.

A prime example is Qatar. At the time, Qatar was secretly supporting Islamic militant groups like Hamas to expand its influence in the Middle East. When this was exposed, it faced pressure from neighboring Arab countries, including severed diplomatic ties and trade sanctions. Cornered, Qatar purchased F-15s from the U.S., Eurofighter Typhoons from the U.K., and Rafales from France, effectively signaling to major powers to "help us." This "courtship of major powers" has continued until recently. Last year, Qatar even handed over a Boeing 747 jumbo jet, worth $400 million (approximately 550 billion KRW), for President Trump to use as his private plane.

[Donald Trump / President of the United States: I asked the Emir (of Qatar). I asked if we could use his new 747. I wanted to use it for a little while. Our planes are too old.]

The reason Middle Eastern countries are buying many of our weapons lately follows a similar logic. While the U.S. and Europe are diplomatically important, they attach complex political and diplomatic conditions when selling weapons, which is a burden for the Middle East. On the other hand, dealing with South Korea carries fewer political burdens, and the calculation is that the performance-to-price ratio is much better.

[Shin Jong-woo / Secretary General of the Korea Defense and Security Forum: In the case of U.S. Patriot missiles, they fire two missiles per target. It is considered a success if one of them hits. However, when the Cheongung-II underwent acceptance testing in the UAE last year, it was done on the condition of succeeding with one shot per target. Simply put, it is one shot, one kill—100%.]

The very fact that they possess South Korean weapons, which are recognized globally, also serves as a deterrent that makes others think twice before provoking them.

3. Piles of Weapons, But No Army to Fight?

There is one more reason why the defense capabilities of Arab nations are weak: their political systems. For leaders in monarchies or authoritarian regimes, a military that is too strong is a burden, as they never know when those guns might be turned against them. Therefore, these countries maintain separate elite units, or royal guards, alongside their regular armies. Professor Andreas Krieg of King's College London points out that in the Arab world, the military and the royal guard are often separated, and in some countries, the royal guard is even larger than the regular army.

In fact, Saudi Arabia's National Guard, known to have 130,000 personnel, is essentially considered a unit for royal protection. In Egypt, the military operates like a massive conglomerate, involved in everything from resorts to construction businesses. Even Jordan, which is considered to have some military capability, relies on foreign mercenaries for a significant portion of its core military personnel. The UAE also entrusts its presidential guard and special forces to Western foreign officers and advisors.

This leads to the criticism that no matter how many weapons they have, they lack the "people" to fight for the country. In the UAE, 90% of the 11 million population are foreigners. While they are said to have 65,000 active-duty troops and 130,000 reservists, a significant number are known to be foreign nationals serving in technical or support roles. If a country goes to war with a mercenary-centered force instead of a total war effort united by patriotism, it is unlikely to succeed.

4. Can the Oil-Rich Nations Change?

Of course, the atmosphere in Arab countries has been changing recently. Saudi Arabia has set a goal to produce more than half of its weapon imports domestically by 2030, and the UAE is accelerating the localization of weapons by merging its state-owned defense companies. However, if inefficient defense spending and the current political systems persist, these efforts may end up being nothing more than "pouring water into a bottomless pit."

(Reported by Kim Jiuk | Produced by Shin Hee-sook | Video by Park Woo-jin and Hwang Se-hoe | Video Editing by Ahn Jun-hyeok | Graphics by Lee Soo-min and Yang Hye-min | Produced by SBS Digital News | Source: DVIDS, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Saudi Ministry of Defense, EDGE)