In the previous installments of the "Stumbling Heavy-Lift Helicopter Project" series, we examined the initial contract and contract modification process between the Forest Aviation Headquarters and the U.S. company Columbia Helicopters, the critical certification issues required to introduce remanufactured former military helicopters, and growing concerns surrounding the remaining contracts scheduled through 2029. At this point, the most pressing question is likely: "Why on earth did the Korea Forest Service push ahead with this contract to this extent?"

(Part 1) Wildfire Helicopter Bought for 38 Billion Won Was Actually a Used US Military Aircraft?
(Part 2) Blind Faith in the Contractor's Word? Was the Contract Modification Justified?
(Part 3) The Core of the Stumbling 320 Billion Won Contract Is 'Certification'… Can It Be Obtained?
(Part 4) Unclear Military Accident History… Is It Really Okay to Proceed With the Project?

As mentioned in previous reports, the key argument emphasized by the Forest Aviation Headquarters was that "there was no alternative." The justification they put forward was "national interest." Their rationale was that if they terminated the contract, there were no other options available, and considering legal issues and economic viability, they had no choice but to modify the contract in pursuit of national interest. Detailed explanations appear in an internal report drafted by the Forest Aviation Headquarters in July 2025, titled "Review Report of the Deliberation Committee on the Introduction of Heavy Helicopters (M234SP)." The following summarizes the main points of the report in accessible terms.
 
This same logic was reiterated when SBS reporters met with officials from the Forest Aviation Headquarters. Key remarks included the following:
 
Let us scrutinize these claims made by the Forest Aviation Headquarters.

First, as noted several times in previous reports, changing the contract from new helicopters to remanufactured military aircraft pushed the delivery deadline back to June 2027—a delay of one year and six months compared to the initial delivery date of late December 2025. Yet, certification issues remain unresolved, and there is no guarantee as to when they might be resolved. In the meantime, the helicopter temporarily deployed during the spring wildfire caution period was, as well known, owned by the U.S. company.


Next is the issue of economic viability. The Forest Aviation Headquarters swapped the aircraft model upon the U.S. contractor's request and agreed to accept remanufactured military aircraft built more than 40 years ago at a price 10% lower than the initial contract sum. To assess economic viability, one must verify whether the remanufactured military helicopters deliver performance and safety commensurate with that price tag. Only then can it be determined whether paying 10% less than the price of a brand-new helicopter is reasonable or grossly overpriced.

While the Forest Aviation Headquarters claimed that "modifying the contract allows purchase at a price 27% lower than the existing purchase cost," the basis for this calculation was that the revised price offered by the contractor ($25,398,000, reduced by 10%) was 27% lower than the average contract price of large helicopters procured by the agency over the two years from 2022 to 2024. Rather than conducting a comparative analysis of models sharing identical performance and conditions, they simply benchmarked it against the average contract amount of past heavy helicopter procurement projects.

What is critical when evaluating economic viability is the safety and certification feasibility of the remanufactured military helicopters that the U.S. contractor is supposed to deliver. The Forest Aviation Headquarters failed to secure concrete records from the past military service of Units 1 through 3—whose airframes have already been designated—such as accident histories and maintenance logs. On certification issues, the agency relied almost entirely on the contractor's optimistic outlook. The certification process remains stalled and is unlikely to be resolved in the short term. Even when the agency sought legal reviews from the Board of Audit and Inspection and the Ministry of Economy and Finance at the time, it did not disclose these certification risks.

The Forest Aviation Headquarters maintains that "canceling the contract would create a gap in wildfire response and damage public trust, whereas maintaining the existing contract through modifications contributes to policy consistency and public confidence." However, with even the U.S. company acknowledging that "meeting the delivery deadline will be difficult," it is questionable whether the agency has truly contributed to securing public trust.

Experts in government contracting and aviation certification, along with the relevant parliamentary standing committee, point out that regardless of the agency's intentions, the fact remains that contract execution has broken down. They insist on investigating why this happened and whether the Forest Aviation Headquarters bears responsibility.
         
If certification issues are not resolved and the U.S. company fails to meet the delivery deadline, the Forest Aviation Headquarters maintains that it will "proceed strictly according to the contract." This means levying liquidated damages for late delivery as stipulated in the contract terms and sequentially considering contract termination. Inside the agency, there is also an apparent sentiment questioning why the agency should shoulder responsibility for the contractor's failings: "Why is it our fault if the contractor fails to meet contract terms?" In fact, officials from the Forest Aviation Headquarters repeatedly told SBS reporters, "If the contractor fails to properly perform the contract, we will simply terminate it."

This is a project backed by more than 326 billion won in national budget. Above all, it is an endeavor undertaken to safeguard citizens' lives, safety, and property. The scale and nature of the project are far too consequential to simply dismiss with claims that there was no alternative or that any failure to perform rests solely on the contractor. If the agency had put even a fraction of the effort it used to lobby the National Assembly for funding following major wildfires into verifying and ensuring that these massive funds were spent properly, the current situation could have been avoided.

Nearly four years have passed since the heavy-lift helicopter project began in 2022. A total of seven helicopters are scheduled for delivery by February 2029, yet it remains uncertain whether even a single unit can arrive on schedule. Rather than deflecting all blame onto the U.S. contractor, the Forest Aviation Headquarters must look inward and examine its own accountability. Since July, the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission has been investigating corruption reports involving the Forest Aviation Headquarters. The Board of Audit and Inspection has also included the heavy-lift helicopter procurement project in its regular audit of the Korea Forest Service. The central questions are whether switching from brand-new aircraft to remanufactured military helicopters that operated for 40 to 60 years was appropriate, whether the purchase price was reasonable, and whether undue preferential treatment or benefits were granted to the contractor.

In the next installment, we will examine effective measures to respond to increasingly severe and large-scale wildfires.