-Regrettable to see North Korean threats on front pages, playing into Pyongyang's intentions
-Revealing cluster bombs? Provocative, but we prepared them 20 years ago
-North has made progress in hypersonic weapons, but terminal strike capability remains unproven
-South Korean military responding firmly following landmine explosion incident
-North Korea seemingly deploying artillery defensively after feeling tangible threats
-Distinction between wartime and peacetime ambiguous; separate command structures create instability
-Limits to U.S. defense of Korean Peninsula make command structure changes inevitable
-Pushed back in UFS simulation drill? Worst-case conditions were deliberately applied
-Only a temporary phenomenon; combined South Korea-U.S. forces have never failed to defend
-Brunson's "new criteria"? Referring to conditions and circumstances, not strict prerequisites
-South Korea possesses considerable combat power... agreement on OPCON transfer possible beyond mere conditions
-OPCON transfer will be pursued based on the South Korea-U.S. alliance
■ Broadcast: SBS Kim Tae-hyun's Political Show (FM 103.5 MHz 7:00 – 9:00 AM)
■ Date: Tuesday, November 3, 2026
■ Host: Lawyer Kim Tae-hyun
■ Guest: Kang Geon-jak, First Deputy Director of the National Security Office
▷Kim Tae-hyun: As announced, we have Kang Geon-jak, First Deputy Director of the Presidential National Security Office, to discuss key security issues such as North Korea's armed provocations and the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON). Welcome, Deputy Director.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Hello.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Looking at your record, you were appointed to the National Security Office on June 21, so it seems you are now entering your fifth month at the presidential office.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Yes, entering the fifth month.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: How has it been working at the National Security Office?
▶Kang Geon-jak: In a word, busy.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Is it much busier and harder than when you were in the military?
▶Kang Geon-jak: I would not necessarily call it difficult. The work itself is manageable. It is manageable, and since there are major developments every day, doing this job also brings a great sense of fulfillment.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: With urgent developments unfolding every day in our security environment recently, you must be even busier. First, let us look at this. A recent editorial headline from the Chosun Ilbo asked, "Can We Truly Trust the Conventional Wisdom That We Overwhelm North Korea in Conventional Power?" Meanwhile, a Hankyoreh editorial read, "Growing Threat of North Korea's Conventional Forces Demands Thorough Preparation." Regardless of whether they are conservative or progressive, many media outlets are raising concerns over whether North Korea's strengthening conventional military capabilities pose a threat to our national security. Is this a situation where the public should worry, or should we not be concerned?
▶Kang Geon-jak: The conventional threat has always existed.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: That is true.
▶Kang Geon-jak: It has always been there. In fact, before North Korea developed nuclear weapons, conventional forces were the biggest threat. Recently, North Korea has been showing off its achievements with very clear photographs. However, I find it somewhat regrettable that our newspapers published their photographs directly on the front page, causing significant anxiety among the public.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: By regrettable, do you mean the media should not have put it on the front page?
▶Kang Geon-jak: What I mean is that, in a way, they ended up playing right into North Korea's intentions.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Into North Korea's intentions.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Among the weapons they displayed this time, there were cluster munitions.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Also known as "Steel Rain."
▶Kang Geon-jak: Exactly. It is the kind of weapon featured in our movies. In fact, we fully developed this 20 years ago, and we actually have hundreds of rounds ready whose individual performance is about double what North Korea demonstrated this time.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: We do?
▶Kang Geon-jak: But because it was developed about 20 years ago, it is already quite aged. Recently, we have reached the stage of considering whether to maintain it as is or upgrade it. So, this is by no means new technology. While the photos were very provocative, it is a system we have thoroughly prepared for a long time.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: I see.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Furthermore, cluster munitions are among the weapons banned globally under the Oslo Convention (Convention on Cluster Munitions).
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Right, because they are considered too inhumane.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Right. However, due to immediate threats, some nations, including South Korea and the United States, have not joined the Oslo Convention and continue to possess these weapons. Therefore, we are somewhat reluctant to boast about them openly.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Also, Deputy Director, North Korea claims to have developed hypersonic missiles. What is your assessment of that?
▶Kang Geon-jak: North Korea has been developing hypersonic weapons for a very long time, and in my view, they seem to have achieved certain milestones. However, these weapons must withstand extreme heat to strike their targets in the terminal phase. The assessment is that they have likely not reached that stage yet. Meanwhile, the system we unveiled recently demonstrated highly precise strikes all the way through the terminal phase. In that regard, North Korean engineers seem to have been somewhat provoked, which led them to make remarks questioning whether there were issues or not.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: What about drones? Media reports have pointed out that North Korea is developing new drones through technological cooperation with Russia and has gained real combat experience in drone warfare in Ukraine. Meanwhile, a drone we developed crashed recently. There seem to be concerns asking if we are really okay.
▶Kang Geon-jak: To be honest, that drone situation was somewhat unfortunate.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: The drone we developed?
▶Kang Geon-jak: The scene during that demonstration, I mean. In fact, the drone we developed is very advanced. Originally required for ground operations, it underwent more than 30 tests on land and was completed very successfully. At the end, the Navy wanted to test it at sea. So, during the process of transferring it to maritime operations, the launcher—known as a canister—was disassembled and reassembled onto a ship. The issue was not with the drone itself, but rather with the canister, which caused the drone to fall during the sea test and that scene was exposed. However, our drone technology itself is at a considerable level, and we are prepared for mass production based on it.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: I see.
▶Kang Geon-jak: So, drones generally do not involve ultra-high-end technology, and there is no major issue in producing them with our domestic technological capabilities. However, the military needs to properly articulate the operational requirements—namely, outlining which parts of existing weapons should be replaced. That process takes a bit of time.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Understood. But why is North Korea openly disclosing conventional weapons like cluster munitions and drones in succession recently? There must be some intention behind it.
▶Kang Geon-jak: While nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapons, military power is ultimately a political instrument, and there are limitations to projecting that solely with nuclear arms. In the end, upgrading conventional weapons allows for much more flexible military operations and makes it easier to exert pressure. That is likely why North Korea is displaying rapid achievements in this area. However, in my assessment, these weapons have yet to be deployed on a large scale to field units; we do not see significant movements indicating that yet.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Is that so?
▶Kang Geon-jak: To put it simply, North Korea showcases new weapons at military parades every year, but the instances of those weapons actually being fielded across its entire military throughout the country are relatively rare. Developing a weapon and fully fielding it into operational service are two different matters. That is how I would describe the situation.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Some news reports recently noted that if you look through binoculars from a certain coffee shop at Aegibong, you can clearly see North Korean self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launchers. This led to concerns that North Korea might be concentrating forces in border areas recently, aiming for some provocation. Are these things we do not need to worry about?
▶Kang Geon-jak: Have you seen those photos?
▷Kim Tae-hyun: The photos?
▶Kang Geon-jak: Yes.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Yes, I did see them.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Did the North Korean artillery look tightly disciplined, and did the soldiers next to them seem alert and severe to you?
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Are you saying those reports might be somewhat misleading or fake news?
▶Kang Geon-jak: No, they did deploy them, and it is indeed unusual activity. But when you look at the soldiers stationed there, they do not appear rushed, tense, or solemn. If we consider the background, following the landmine explosion incident, there were many criticisms in our media that our military was responding passively. In reality, our military responded very forcefully at the front lines. Whenever anything crossed even slightly, we conducted numerous warning broadcasts and warning shots. It seems they felt a tangible threat from this. In fact, Vice Department Director Kim Yo-jong proved it herself, reacting very strongly by citing nearly 3,000 broadcasts and over 200 rounds of warning shots. At that time, North Korea stated using their own terms that they would deploy firepower sub-units in various locations, and what we are seeing seems to be precisely that deployment.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Right.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Overall, rather than viewing this from an offensive standpoint, it appears to be from a somewhat defensive perspective.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Rather defensive?
▶Kang Geon-jak: Yes. I would cautiously assess that it is an activity of that nature.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Understood. In any case, given these provocations from North Korea, the conservative opposition is questioning whether transferring OPCON now might compromise national defense. What are your thoughts on this?
▶Kang Geon-jak: Threats from North Korea are a constant reality.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: True.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Furthermore, while conventional military capabilities might have been comparable in the past, or even tilted in North Korea's favor at times, the gap is now widening significantly. In reality, it is widening enormously. Next year, we will allocate around 73 trillion won to defense spending alone, which is roughly equivalent to South Korea's entire national budget in the late 1990s. We are investing that much into defense alone. North Korea inevitably falls behind in financial terms, so while risks remain, the gap in real capabilities will only continue to grow.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: The gap in capabilities.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Yes. So there is that aspect, and there is also the fact that the global order is shifting. Therefore, changes regarding OPCON and the South Korea-U.S. combined command structure are not just being discussed on our side; there are also considerable voices in the United States advocating for such changes.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Yes.
▶Kang Geon-jak: In addition, while we have relied on this for a long time, the current structure dictates that peacetime operational control rests with the South Korean military, while wartime control shifts to the Combined Forces Command. But let me ask you: how exactly do we distinguish between wartime and peacetime?
▷Kim Tae-hyun: From what I understand, whether the situation constitutes wartime or not is decided jointly by the South Korean and U.S. presidents.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Right. When the CFC commander recommends shifting to wartime, the two presidents must make the decision. But let me pose another question: is the conflict in Ukraine a war or not?
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Wouldn't that count as wartime?
▶Kang Geon-jak: Yet from Russia's perspective, they claim it is not a war.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: From Russia's perspective.
▶Kang Geon-jak: For Ukraine, it is a war. Then, was the conflict involving Iran a war or not?
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Now I feel like a student taking a quiz! At that level, for Iran, it certainly was a war.
▶Kang Geon-jak: But the U.S. called it a military operation, Operation Epic Fury, not a war. From Iran's perspective, it was a war. So in reality, the criteria dividing wartime from peacetime are quite ambiguous.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Indeed, unless a formal declaration of war is passed by a legislature, that can certainly be the case.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Exactly. Yet our current system strictly demarcates war and peacetime, assigning command to entirely different headquarters. Having this hinge on a political decision by both presidents in an urgent crisis carries an element of instability. There is a contradiction where similar situations might be handled by the South Korean military alone or under a combined command system. Ultimately, these issues need to be resolved. We cannot predict how future military threats will evolve, so relying on such a dichotomous command structure to prepare and respond poses inherent instability.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Yes.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Also, you may have heard the day before yesterday that our Minister of National Defense mentioned the issue of whether the U.S., while engaged in a conflict involving Iran, could defend us—though that was not his actual intent. But in reality, if the U.S. is fighting a war like the one involving Iran and a similar situation arises on the Korean Peninsula, could it exert the same amount of power here? During the conflict with Iran, Saudi Arabia desperately sought assistance from the U.S., but the U.S. could not readily assist. Similarly, from the U.S. perspective, it must project military force globally to fulfill its worldwide strategy, making it difficult to concentrate as intensively on the defense of the entire Korean Peninsula as it did in the past.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: The global situation itself.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Such shifts are underway. Therefore, we should not solely look at the North Korean threat. I believe we have more than enough capability to counter North Korea's threats on our own. Furthermore, looking at the changing world order and the strategic vision the U.S. pursues, changes in our command structure are virtually inevitable.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: But there was a recent report about the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) simulation exercise last August. It reported that when we exercised command, northern Gyeonggi Province was invaded and forces were pushed back near Seoul. Of course, the simulation showed that after northern Gyeonggi was breached and forces were pushed back toward Seoul, we counterattacked and pushed back up. Still, being pushed back to northern Gyeonggi and near Seoul is concerning. Will we be all right?
▶Kang Geon-jak: We conduct joint exercises twice a year. Those exercises literally create the most severe and challenging conditions for the South Korea-U.S. combined forces.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Worst-case scenarios?
▶Kang Geon-jak: The person operating the opposing force (OPFOR) in that exercise is the CFC commander. The CFC commander directs the opposing force to apply maximum pressure on the combined forces to see if they can respond, which is directly tied to the exercise's purpose. For instance, they might concentrate North Korean forces in one sector to break through intensively, or mount concentrated breakthroughs in completely unexpected areas like Ganghwa Island or Gangwon Province. Such variables are introduced in every drill. And under no circumstances have the combined forces ever failed to defend. Moreover, while it is called the combined forces, the vast majority of the actual combat power is the South Korean military.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: That makes sense.
▶Kang Geon-jak: In fact, the U.S. share of support during the defensive phase is gradually decreasing, and the South Korean military is overcoming such harsh conditions through its own defensive capabilities. In some scenarios, since our intelligence and air power are overwhelmingly superior, severe contingency constraints are imposed—such as disabling air power operations entirely for the first three days. Imposing such extreme scenarios is the very purpose of this training. Therefore, using a temporary development in an exercise to judge our overall capabilities or readiness is somewhat excessive.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: General Brunson, the USFK commander, recently made remarks in the United States that sparked controversy, saying that "new criteria have emerged regarding OPCON transfer conditions." In effect, saying the previous conditions are no longer enough, and transfer can only happen once the new criteria are met. Do you have a sense of what these new criteria are?
▶Kang Geon-jak: He made remarks in another setting clarifying that while the word "condition" can mean a prerequisite, he was not referring to formal conditions in that sense, but rather emphasizing that circumstances on the Korean Peninsula are changing. Furthermore, the items established as conditions for OPCON transfer do not encompass the entirety of South Korea's defense capabilities or combat power. They are simply specific agreed-upon areas requiring evaluation under the context of OPCON transfer.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Yes.
▶Kang Geon-jak: For instance, within our defense budget, the portion of defense improvement expenses dedicated specifically to meeting OPCON transfer conditions is only about 5%. The remainder represents immense combat power dedicated to defending the peninsula. For example, the F-35 is not listed among those conditions. Aegis destroyers are not included. Our submarines are not included. Neither are our K-9 howitzers or K-2 main battle tanks. In other words, these conditions do not represent the total capability of the South Korean military; they are merely a list of about 30 specific items required for OPCON transfer.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Right.
▶Kang Geon-jak: If you look solely at the conditions, it might seem as though they serve as the sole barometer for defending South Korea, but interpreting it that way is unreasonable. Since Commander Brunson is the commander responsible for examining those conditions, he continues to emphasize them. However, regarding the comprehensive evaluation for OPCON transfer, if we engage in strategic assessments and situational evaluations alongside the United States, I believe we can reach an agreement that goes beyond those specific conditions.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Deputy Director, the President stated during yesterday's parliamentary policy speech that we will definitely reclaim OPCON and even set a specific deadline. But what options do we have if consultations with the United States do not go smoothly by then?
▶Kang Geon-jak: Fundamentally, I believe the consultations will go well. I expect positive outcomes, though I cannot share definitive details. However, by restructuring our command structure and establishing the system, posture, and capabilities to actually exercise OPCON—while assessing the situation at that time—making a forward-looking decision by demonstrating our readiness and capabilities to the U.S., rather than antagonizing them, is being considered as one of several options.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Deputy Director, we have about 20 seconds left. Are you also considering unilaterally declaring the reclamation of OPCON as a card on the table?
▶Kang Geon-jak: Some people speak of such extreme options, but I believe the end state must ultimately be grounded in the South Korea-U.S. alliance. We must build a better posture and command structure based on the alliance.
▷Kim Tae-hyun: Understood. We will wrap it up here. This was Kang Geon-jak, First Deputy Director of the Presidential National Security Office. Thank you.
▶Kang Geon-jak: Thank you.
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