Read <Disasters, Catastrophes, and the Aftermath> Reporter's Notebook Series
☞ [Reporter's Notebook ①] Search, Identification, Prevention: State Duties Passed on to Bereaved Families
☞ [Reporter's Notebook ②] Can One Grieve Without Knowing the Reason for Death?
☞ [Reporter's Notebook ③] Remains Found by Bereaved Families with Hand Hoes: A Belatedly Resumed Search
About two weeks before Chuseok, Lee Young-moon visited a Buddhist temple where the name of her son, Heo Jae-yong, was enshrined. After making an offering of rice, she entered the main hall, lit incense, and prayed for a long time. The family visits this temple on Heo's birthday, traditional holidays, and March 31, the day the Stella Daisy sank. Lee also tries not to miss the prayer gathering held on the first day of each lunar month. Asking herself, "Will it be this year, or will it be next year?", the time she has spent waiting for her son is now nearing a decade.
The Stella Daisy sank in the South Atlantic Ocean on March 31, 2017. A total of 22 crew members—eight South Koreans and 14 Filipinos—never returned, and Heo Jae-yong was among them. The last time Lee saw her son was about four months earlier. The mother cooked seaweed soup for her son on his lunar birthday, and the son, preparing to leave the country, promised to pay for his mother's leg surgery when he returned next time.
For several years after the disaster, Lee did not know where to go whenever her son's birthday or holidays came around. Because his remains had not been recovered, she could not hold a funeral, nor could she establish a gravesite or a columbarium niche to visit. Whenever she saw posts about other disaster victims' families preparing their children's favorite foods and visiting columbariums, she even felt envious. "I was so heartbroken and envious. But I couldn't even bring myself to say that out loud."
Immediately after the sinking, the families demanded that the search continue, including for undiscovered life rafts. Over time, their demands expanded to locating the sunken hull to confirm traces of the missing crew members and determine the cause of the sinking. The government decided to conduct a deep-sea search in August 2018, about one year and four months after the disaster. The stated objectives were to check undiscovered life rafts to determine whether the missing crew members were alive, locate the hull, and investigate the cause of the sinking. In December of that year, the government signed a contract worth approximately 4.84 billion won with Ocean Infinity, a deep-sea exploration firm. The contract included searching for the hull, locating unidentified life rafts upon discovery, generating 3D images of the wreckage, and retrieving the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR, the ship's black box) if technically feasible. However, the retrieval of human remains, which the families had longed for, was not included in the scope of work.
That discrepancy came to light once the actual search began. In February 2019, the search team deployed to the area of the sinking discovered ship debris, including the bridge—where navigation and vessel operations are conducted—and retrieved the VDR. Objects appearing to be human bones and what was believed to be work clothes were also identified on the seabed. The South Korean government asked the company to recover what appeared to be human remains, but the contractor replied that retrieval was not possible at the time due to the need for specialized equipment and techniques, requiring further consultations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also explained that retrieving human remains had not been part of the original contractual duties. Furthermore, the retrieved VDR data chip was damaged, allowing only partial data extraction and failing to fully restore the conditions at the time of the sinking.¹
In the end, while the first deep-sea search confirmed the bridge, hull debris, and human traces, the contract ended without recovering the remains or fully restoring the VDR records. This led the families to demand a "second deep-sea search." They urged authorities to allocate a separate budget and secure a new contract to return to the site, recover the remains, and further investigate the cause of the sinking that had been left unresolved during the initial search.
In pursuing a second deep-sea search, budget allocations and questions of accountability emerged as major stumbling blocks. The National Assembly held consecutive public hearings to discuss the results of the initial search and the necessity of additional efforts. The Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee repeatedly debated plans to allocate a 10 billion won budget for a second search. Although an increased budget bill was approved at the standing committee stage, it was not included in the final government budget.
The Ministry of Economy and Finance cited reasons such as the fact that because the Stella Daisy was a private commercial vessel, the shipping company should bear primary responsibility, that the government had already provided reserve funds for the first search, and that repeatedly shouldering search costs for private vessels could set a precedent for other incidents. Conversely, the Foreign Affairs Ministry explained that while it attempted to secure a supplementary search budget in consideration of demands from families and parliament, it was ultimately omitted. The plea to "bring back our loved ones" had devolved into questions over which ministry should oversee the operation, where budgetary decisions are made, and who between the state and the private shipping company should bear the costs.
In 2020, the families filed a petition with the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) demanding a second deep-sea search, arguing that their fundamental human rights were violated by the foreign ministry's failure to conduct additional searches. In 2021, the NHRCK expressed the opinion that an additional deep-sea search was necessary to uncover the precise cause of the sinking and recover the remains of missing crew members. In legal form, this was an "expression of opinion" directed to the Prime Minister rather than a formal "recommendation." However, the petition itself was dismissed because the families were already engaged in a separate lawsuit seeking state liability for failing to conduct the additional search.
The families also filed an administrative lawsuit challenging the foreign ministry's refusal to disclose information regarding the initial deep-sea search. Their campaign for an additional search unfolded across parliamentary budget deliberations and NHRCK petitions, alongside a separate freedom of information lawsuit to access documents from the first search. However, none of these procedures directly led to a second deep-sea search.
While debates over funding for a second search dragged on across parliament and government ministries, marine inquiries assessing the cause of the sinking were proceeding separately. The families learned that a marine inquiry regarding the Stella Daisy was underway at the Busan Regional Maritime Safety Tribunal in 2020 during a conversation with an investigator from the Special Investigation Commission on Social Disasters. Heo Young-joo, the elder sister of Heo Jae-yong and co-representative of the Stella Daisy Disaster Countermeasures Committee, stated that despite multiple previous meetings with government officials, she had received no notice about the ongoing maritime inquiry or any guidance on how the families could participate.
The families later read the Act on the Investigation of and Inquiry into Marine Accidents themselves and discovered they could participate as "interested parties." Once recognized as interested parties, individuals can appoint maritime counsel to represent them, request access to and copies of relevant materials, and present their views during proceedings with the presiding tribunal officer's permission. The families utilized this process. A policy study examining the participation rights of disaster victims noted, based on interviews with the families, that the maritime tribunal failed to proactively inform them of the proceedings or the "interested party" system.²
In December 2023, the Busan Regional Maritime Safety Tribunal ruled that structural vulnerabilities in the Stella Daisy, combined with inadequate maintenance and improper alternate hold discharging—unloading cargo unevenly by emptying certain cargo holds first—reflected negligence in vessel management by the shipping company, constituting a major cause of the sinking. When the shipping company challenged the ruling, the case moved to the Central Maritime Safety Tribunal, where the families continued participating as interested parties in the second-instance inquiry.
On March 25, 2026, the Central Maritime Safety Tribunal ruled that the vessel's hull had been compromised following its conversion, with long-term fatigue damage accumulated over time, compounded by the shipping company's negligence in safety management. It determined that these factors caused hull damage and worsening flooding during the voyage, resulting in the sinking. This second-instance tribunal ruling came nearly nine years after the disaster occurred. However, the shipping company filed a lawsuit with the Daejeon High Court seeking to overturn the ruling. The families of the missing crew members, who participated as interested parties in both the Busan and central tribunals, have now joined the lawsuit as intervenors supporting the defendant.
Criminal proceedings were divided largely into two separate cases. The first to reach a conclusion concerned violations of the Ship Safety Act regarding the failure to report vessel defects to relevant authorities. Prosecutors indicted the shipping company's former chief executive and other executives on charges of failing to report defects that could jeopardize navigational safety. In July 2024, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's sentence of six months in prison for the former CEO. The families learned of the former CEO's indictment only through news reports, and because they were not notified of changes in court dates, they had to monitor the case's progress on their own. In the Ship Safety Act case, the families were not granted legal status as victims in criminal proceedings.³
The other criminal trial examined whether professional negligence by shipping company executives and employees caused the ship to sink, leading to the deaths of 22 people. About five years after the disaster, seven officials, including the former CEO, were indicted. In February 2024, the Busan District Court sentenced the former CEO to three years of imprisonment without prison labor, the former marine affairs division head to two years of imprisonment without prison labor, and an inspection manager to one year of imprisonment without prison labor suspended for two years. The remaining four employees were acquitted. The first-instance court recognized negligence among some defendants for failing to perform necessary inspections, repairs, and safety measures despite repeated defects in the aging converted vessel. However, it did not accept the prosecution's claim that alternate hold loading and unloading, which deviated from approved loading conditions, damaged the hull and directly led to the sinking.
On September 17, an appellate court reached a different conclusion on this point. The Busan High Court acknowledged that alternate hold loading and discharging increased structural damage and vulnerabilities in the hull, influencing or accelerating the sinking. The court also found that the former CEO and former marine affairs division head failed to take adequate measures despite being aware of repeatedly reported defects. The appellate court thus affirmed a causal relationship between alternate hold operations and the sinking, which the first-instance court had dismissed.
However, the sentences were reduced compared to the first instance. The former CEO was sentenced to two years of imprisonment without prison labor, the former marine affairs division head to one year and six months of imprisonment without prison labor suspended for three years, and the inspection manager to ten months of imprisonment without prison labor suspended for two years. The court stated that it considered settlements and compensation deposits made for bereaved families, as well as finalized convictions in separate cases, in determining sentences for the former CEO and marine affairs head. The families of the missing crew members and the countermeasures committee protested vehemently, pointing out that sentences were reduced even though the scope of recognized negligence and causation had broadened. "Because the court acknowledged alternate hold discharging—a crucial cause of the sinking that had been dismissed in the first instance—we naturally expected harsher sentences than the first trial," said Heo Young-joo. "We cannot understand how sentences could be reduced after acknowledging greater professional negligence and causation." As both the prosecution and defendants recently appealed, the case has now been sent to the Supreme Court.
The family of Heo Jae-yong first took to the streets about a month after the tragedy. When they went out to Gwanghwamun Square, families of the Sewol ferry disaster visited them. Heo Gyeong-joo remembers how the Sewol families embraced them and apologized, expressing regret that another family had to suffer the same agony because the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries had not changed despite their three years of fighting. At that time, Heo said, she never imagined their fight to find her younger brother and determine the cause of the sinking would last nearly a decade. When the first deep-sea search was finally approved after much struggle, she believed finding the ship would reveal the cause and bring her brother home.
Yet, while the first search confirmed objects presumed to be human remains, they were not recovered, and a second deep-sea search was never launched. "I feel like I can only close my eyes in peace once I hold a funeral for my son," said Lee Young-moon. "Who would ever want to become a bereaved family? Yet we want to be bereaved families, not families of the missing." Heo Gyeong-joo also wiped away tears, saying she fights to the end so that when she meets her brother in the future, she can say, "Your sister did everything she could for you and for Mom. I have no shame before you."
March 31 of next year will mark the 10th anniversary of the Stella Daisy disaster. Over the years, the families scrutinized deep-sea exploration contracts to locate their loved ones and tracked the flow of state budgets to demand a renewed search. Upon belatedly discovering the maritime inquiry was taking place, they read the law themselves to participate as interested parties; and when the shipping company sued to overturn the ruling, they returned to court as intervenors. While the search, budgeting, inquiry into the sinking, and criminal accountability were handled across disparate agencies and separate procedures, the task of connecting them into a single coherent tragedy fell entirely on the families. The mother's hope of bringing her son home for a proper funeral has never wavered, but when that wish will be fulfilled remains unknown. Lee Young-moon is now approaching her 80th birthday. (End)
¹ "Recovery of Stella Daisy 'Black Box'... 'Analysis of Circumstances at Time of Accident,'" Yonhap News, July 29, 2019.
² Institute for Human Rights, Environment and Business, "A Study on the Status and Improvement Measures for Guaranteeing the Participation Rights of Disaster Victims in the Fact-Finding Process," Policy Research Report for Disaster Victims' Rights Center 'With Us', December 15, 2024, pp. 72–74.
³ Ibid., pp. 74–75.
Watch Broadcast (Aired September 26, 2026 on TV)
(Video & Editing by Kim Tae-hoon)
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