In previous coverage, this series closely examined issues surrounding the contract modification process for the first aircraft in the Korea Forest Service's super-large wildfire-fighting helicopter project, particularly focusing on the core issue of certification.
The problem does not end there. The super-large helicopters that the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters contracted with the U.S. company Columbia Helicopters are all remanufactured aircraft. Formerly used by the U.S. military, they are disassembled and reassembled so they can be operated by civilians for firefighting. However, for helicopters No. 1 through No. 3, whose airframes have been finalized, there are no military accident history logs or detailed flight and maintenance records from their time in military service.
For all aircraft, detailed records are maintained to ensure flight safety. Government agencies such as the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and South Korea's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport certify individual aircraft as airworthy based on meticulous logs tracking when, how far, and how long they flew, what accidents occurred if any, how repairs and maintenance were conducted, and what specific replacement parts were installed. Such records are strictly managed.
Among the aircraft contracted by the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters, helicopter No. 1 was built in the 1980s, while helicopters No. 2 and No. 3 were manufactured in the 1960s. These helicopters were built between 40 and 60 years ago, but the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters failed to obtain military records from the initial 10 to 20 years when they were operated by the U.S. military. It cannot be ruled out that they were deployed to combat zones or actual military operations, or that they sustained serious damage in accidents. In both the 1960s and 1980s, the aircraft type (Chinook) served as a core asset of the U.S. Army.
Yet, the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters took no significant action even after confirming in person during an overseas business trip in February 2025 to inspect airframes at the U.S. company that accident history logs from the military era were missing for helicopters No. 2 and No. 3. After SBS began its reporting, the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters received a reply document from the U.S. Department of the Army through the contractor, but this document also contained no detailed records, such as military accident history logs or specific flight and maintenance records.
The Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters interprets the U.S. Department of the Army official's statement in the document that "the aircraft are intact and flyable" as meaning they are safe overall, spanning from their past military service through post-modification resale. Therefore, the agency expects that this document can also be accepted as a valid record in domestic airworthiness certification procedures. In addition, the agency maintains that even if there were severe accidents or damage during the initial military era, safety will not be a major issue because the helicopters undergo disassembly, modification, and repair processes at the level required by certification procedures during the remanufacturing phase.
Regarding this, Choi Yong-hoon, head of the Airworthiness Certification Division at the Korea Institute of Aviation Safety Technology, who was interviewed by SBS, stated that the information secured by the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters is not sufficient to verify safety.
"People often think that because the military operated it for decades and it is a proven design, one can confidently take it over and say, 'It has been proven.' But whether that aircraft actually complies with the technical standards set by civil airworthiness authorities once it crosses into the civilian sector is another matter. (Omitted) To define its current state, we must verify what processes the aircraft went through from the point of its initial development and production, how it was operated, and whether it properly complied with the procedures and standards approved by airworthiness authorities. And because certification is granted based on that definition to ensure safe flight, I believe certification will only be possible if past history, information, or relevant supporting documentation equivalent to that is available."
- Choi Yong-hoon, Head of the Airworthiness Certification Division, Korea Institute of Aviation Safety Technology
Choi also explained the situation with an easy-to-understand analogy.
"To compare the absence of (detailed military-era) history to a car: if we buy a car without knowing whether it has a flood damage history or not, and it turns out to be a flood-damaged vehicle, we end up having to drive it while carrying the uncertainty of not knowing where a problem might occur. Ultimately, that uncertainty directly impacts safety, and when it comes to aircraft, I believe it could become a fatal issue directly tied to safety."
- Choi Yong-hoon, Head of the Airworthiness Certification Division, Korea Institute of Aviation Safety Technology
Even in this situation, the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters signed an additional contract with the same U.S. company in January worth $136,438,000 (195,087,240,000 won based on the exchange rate at the time of the contract). It signed a package contract to introduce four more remanufactured military helicopters—units No. 4 through No. 7, for which airframes have not even been secured—by February 2029. With this, the super-large helicopters contracted between the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters and the company total seven aircraft, amounting to 326,013,380,000 won.
However, the company has not yet paid the contract performance bond of about 10 billion won related to the additional package contract for the four helicopters signed in January. Simply put, a contract performance bond is money paid as a certain percentage of the contract value as collateral in case the contractor fails to fulfill contract terms, such as defaulting on obligations or missing delivery deadlines. Although the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters extended the contractor's deadline to pay the bond until July, it remains unpaid.
"(Extending the bond payment deadline) can be viewed as preferential treatment. In domestic transactions, the contract bond is paid immediately upon concluding a contract, whether in the form of a guarantee bond or cash."
- Attorney Kang Doo-won, SBS interview
The contractor stated, "Because the bond amount increased due to the package contract, we have not been able to pay it yet due to company circumstances," while adding, "We will pay it as soon as possible."
An even bigger problem is that the delivery deadline for helicopter No. 2 is late November, less than three months away. With the core issue of certification unresolved, even the contractor cannot guarantee whether helicopter No. 2 will be delivered properly. The company stated, "Meeting the delivery deadline is difficult under the current circumstances," adding, "If necessary, we may have to delay delivery even if it means paying liquidated damages."
If the company is already unable to pay even the contract performance bond and is now in a position where it must pay liquidated damages for missing the delivery deadline of helicopter No. 2, can this project proceed properly?
The Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters stated, "If the manufacturer fails to satisfy contract requirements, we will not accept the aircraft," adding, "If the contract deadline is breached due to reasons attributable to the manufacturer, we will strictly review necessary measures in accordance with relevant laws and contract conditions."
In short, their stance is: 'All responsibility lies with the manufacturer. That is what the contract conditions dictate.' The irresponsible attitude of the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters will be addressed in the upcoming coverage.
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