On March 4, 2022, a wildfire that started in Uljin, North Gyeongsang Province, spread all the way to Samcheok, Gangwon Province. It took 222 hours to contain the main blaze, scorching 16,302 hectares—an area equivalent to 23,000 soccer fields—and causing approximately 908.6 billion won in damages. According to Korea Forest Service statistics, it was one of the longest-burning wildfires in history.
As large-scale wildfires began drawing serious attention, the need for "large helicopters" to extinguish massive wildfires began to emerge within the Korea Forest Service.
In December of that year, the Korea Forest Service released the "Long-Term National Wildfire Prevention Measures (2023–2027)." The plan called for transitioning firefighting helicopters to "center on super-large helicopters" and expanding the fleet from 48 aircraft in 2022 to 58 by 2027, with 13 of them being super-large models.
The project progressed so rapidly that two months earlier, in October, the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters had already posted a Request for Proposals (RFP) to purchase one super-large helicopter on the public procurement portal Nara Marketplace. The project later grew to a scale of seven helicopters. When adding up the contracts signed so far, the amount reaches $227.4 million, or roughly 320 billion won. So, were the large helicopters ultimately brought in?
As of September 2026, a single super-large helicopter sits in the hangar of the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters. An induction ceremony was even held for this helicopter this past January. However, this helicopter reportedly does not belong to the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters. As indicated by the registration number "N473CH" on its tail, it is registered with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and its registered owner is Columbia Helicopters of Oregon, United States. Put simply, despite vast sums of taxpayer money spent on the contract, South Korean pilots cannot even fly it as they please.
To find out why this happened, this report examined the Request for Proposals, contracts, written responses submitted by the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters to the National Assembly, interviews with Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters officials, and U.S. government records.
What Were the Requirements Set by the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters?The public notice posted on the Public Procurement Service's Nara Marketplace on October 24, 2022, was titled "heavy forest helicopter(1SET)." The budget listed in the item specifications was $33.2 million (approximately 49.8 billion won).
The Request for Proposals explicitly detailed what the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters wanted. The project objective was one super-large-class helicopter capable of day and night wildfire suppression and external cargo transport. "Super-large-class" was defined as an "aircraft with a total water tank capacity of 5,000 liters or more." Regarding the airframe, vendors could propose "newly manufactured aircraft or remanufactured aircraft," but specified that "if the manufacturer of the proposed model is currently producing new units, newly manufactured units must be delivered." For remanufactured aircraft, it strictly stipulated that "the airframe must have no accident history, such as a crash, rollover, or hard landing." In other words, the intent was to purchase a brand-new aircraft or, at the very least, an airframe free of any accident history.
The core conditions in the helicopter acquisition project were the definition of "mandatory specifications" and the airworthiness certification clause. Mandatory specifications were defined as "specifications that are installed, provided, and fulfilled by the delivery date, and approved by South Korea's airworthiness authority so as to achieve the project's objectives."
Here, "airworthiness" refers to a state in which an aircraft can fly safely. Since an aircraft without airworthiness certification cannot take to the skies, this is the most essential requirement. Ultimately, it meant that an aircraft had to clear both stages to become a Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters helicopter.
How, then, did the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters address this in the Request for Proposals? It stated, "To prove flight safety, the helicopter must have completed standard or special airworthiness certification by South Korea's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport." For an aircraft undergoing certification, it required submitting an "acquisition plan to obtain approval by the delivery date."
It also wrote, "If domestic operation is impossible due to the non-approval of various certifications for the helicopter, mission equipment, etc., by the delivery deadline, acceptance will be rejected, and the bidder shall bear full responsibility for all resulting costs and damages."
Simply put, the aircraft had to be delivered with South Korean government certification completed; otherwise, it would not be accepted, and the contractor would assume all liability.
Bidding Decided by a 0.18-Point MarginTwo companies took part in the bidding: Erickson of the United States, which remanufactures the S-64, and Columbia, which participated through domestic bidder Daejin Aviation.
The model proposed by Columbia was the Boeing Vertol Model 234, or M234. It was a model that obtained civilian type certification in the United States in 1981, and Columbia was the company holding that type certificate.
The Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters also explained its selection rationale to the National Assembly, stating that "at the time the initial contract was signed, Columbia Helicopters was a company holding type certificates for the M234 and Model 107 models from the U.S. FAA."
According to the evaluation results submitted by the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters to the National Assembly, the competition was decided on price. In the technical evaluation, Erickson scored 76.03 points, higher than Columbia's 73.76 points. However, while Columbia proposed $28.22 million and received a perfect 20 points in the price score, Erickson, which proposed over $32.157 million, received only 17.55 points.
The total scores were 93.76 points to 93.58 points. By a razor-thin margin of 0.18 points, Columbia took first place.
Thus, the contract was signed on December 16, 2022. The contract amount was $28.22 million, roughly 38 billion won in Korean currency. The delivery deadline was December 14, 2025.
Up to this point, there appeared to be no major issue.
Helicopter Cannot Be Built? The Shaky ContractHowever, problems arose. The manufacturer, Columbia, notified that it could not build the contracted aircraft. Two years and three months after signing the contract, things were thrown back to square one.
The first time Columbia raised the idea of switching to the remanufactured M234SP model, citing difficulties in building a brand-new M234, was during an October 2024 monthly report. The Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters stated that at the time, it "judged that the inability to manufacture a new M234 constituted the fault of the manufacturer, and conveyed the position that modifying the contract solely based on the manufacturer's request would be difficult."
Nevertheless, Columbia officially requested a model change on March 28, 2025. This was 27 months after the contract had been signed, and eight and a half months before the delivery deadline. The request letter sent by Columbia to the head of the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters began as follows:
"First, we acknowledge the problems surrounding the initial performance of the contract award… (omitted) ... was based on an unrealistic proposal."
Columbia cited two reasons for the change: that the firefighting water tank interfered with the fuel tank structure of the M234, and that "the FAA's revised crash-resistant fuel system requirements were nearly impossible requirements to apply to the manufacturing of a new M234 helicopter." It also wrote, "We came to realize how difficult it is to newly manufacture an aircraft whose production had ceased for decades." In effect, the company admitted its own liability.
The U.S. regulation referred to here is the Crash Resistant Fuel System (CRFS) requirement. It is a standard requiring reinforced fuel systems to prevent fires after a crash. When introduced in 1994, it applied only to newly type-certificated models, meaning the Model M234, which received type certification in 1981, was exempt. However, under U.S. federal law enacted in October 2018 (49 U.S.C. §44737), it applies to helicopters whose manufacturing is completed after April 5, 2020, regardless of how old the model design is. The FAA announced this via a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB SW-17-31R1) in December 2018.
The problem lies in the drop test. U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations stipulate that a fuel tank filled to 80% of its normal maximum capacity, housed within an airframe structure representing the actual installation, must be dropped from a height of 50 feet (approximately 15 meters) without leaking. The structure used in the test is destroyed. In other words, to sell one unit, another airframe must be built and smashed.
The Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters relayed that Columbia claimed it was difficult to pass the test and make delivery because "that single fuselage is extremely expensive."
How, then, did Columbia win this contract in the first place? The head of the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters mentioned the possibility that Columbia initially judged it could deliver one new unit since it held the M234 type certificate and possessed fuselages, but only after entering the manufacturing and certification process realized that it had to build an additional fuselage and put it through a drop test, thereby concluding it could not deliver an M234.
When reporters asked, "Were the strengthened regulations already in place at the time the contract was signed in 2022?" an official responded, "Yes, that is correct." When asked whether the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters was aware of them, the official answered, "We had no way of knowing that far. We were not aware of whether such tightened regulations existed in the U.S. FAA."
Another company was caught by the same regulation. Erickson, which had lost the bidding for Unit 1 by 0.18 points, later won the contract for Unit 2 but forfeited it voluntarily. During a parliamentary audit in October 2024, the Korea Forest Service Minister at the time answered, "There was a case where a company that bid on a contract forfeited it after paying a penalty because the costs did not match up."
The head of the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters explained the circumstances to reporters as follows:
"When they were told that they also had to take a new fuselage and conduct that test, they said midway through that this was something they simply could not do, paid the performance bond penalty, and terminated the contract—that was Erickson. So it is unlikely they were unaware of that rule."
A competitor backed out while paying the bond forfeiture because it was aware of the regulations. Columbia, on the other hand, claimed it could build it and signed the contract, only to declare two years and three months later that it could not. What has been revealed so far is that the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters was unaware of such regulations at the time.
The first step of the 320-billion-won project was thus misplaced from the very beginning.
From Brand-New to Remanufactured... From Civilian to Military? Why?Ultimately, the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters amended the contract on October 10, 2025.
The model was switched from the brand-new M234 to the remanufactured M234SP, the contract amount was reduced by 10% from the original contract to $25,398,000 (approximately 36.3 billion won), and the delivery deadline was changed to June 29, 2027.
The altered model warrants closer examination. The M234 originally agreed upon was flawless based strictly on the terms written in the contract. Because it was a model that had received civilian type certification in the United States, the door was open to apply for type certificate validation with South Korea's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and both the airframe and major components were entirely brand-new.
What was changed at the manufacturer's request was not a new product, but a remanufactured one. The Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters had directly defined remanufacturing in its Request for Proposals: it refers to "restoring performance and quality to a state equivalent to or better than a new product," including the use of overhauled airframes and parts, while specifying that "refurbished proposals" were unacceptable. The intent was to distinguish it from second-hand goods brought in as-is. However, the reason the new product was changed to a remanufactured one this time was not due to performance or quality. As seen earlier, it was because it simply could not be manufactured.
The modified M234SP has yet to receive type certification in the United States and remains under development. Furthermore, rather than being a civilian aircraft, this model is built by modifying the CH-47D military Chinook. Military aircraft do not possess civilian type certification. This means that to fly it as a civilian aircraft, certification must be obtained completely from scratch. Currently, all this family of aircraft holds in the U.S. is a "Restricted Category Type Certificate," limited to special purposes such as wildfire suppression, whereas type certificate validation under South Korea's Aviation Safety Act targets aircraft that have "received type certification from a foreign government." The crux of the matter is that it was switched to a model far more difficult to certify domestically.
The Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters also summarized this point to the National Assembly: "The M234SP and CH-47D are not airframes of differing performance, but rather aircraft of identical shape and performance with different designations depending on the certifying entity." This means that what the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters agreed to buy by amending the contract was an airframe remanufactured from a Chinook once used by the U.S. military.
It was not just the airframe that changed. Many of the components were also altered. What changed is shown in a table in Columbia's modification request. In the originally contracted M234, the airframe, engines, gearbox, blades (rotors), rotor heads, landing gear, and hydraulic servos were all "100% new."
In the M234SP, the airframe is remanufactured, the engines are "TBO 2000+," the gearbox is "On Condition," and the blades, landing gear, and hydraulic servos are "Reconditioned." All of this means using overhauled, previously used components. In response, the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters told the National Assembly that the condition was to accept delivery after major components undergo disassembly inspection and overhaul, resetting their service life to zero hours, just like new parts.
Why, then, remanufacturing? There is one answer confirmed by documentation. The CRFS requirement that prevented new production does not apply to remanufactured airframes. Materials submitted by the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters to the National Assembly also summarized this change as "(Original specification) New helicopter M234 → (Changed) Remanufactured helicopter M234SP (CRFS certification not required)."
By abandoning a new build and pivoting to remanufacturing a used airframe, the fuel system safety standards required for new aircraft were sidestepped altogether. This could be viewed as a contract that accommodated the vendor's circumstances to a considerable extent. From South Korea's standpoint, it ended up with an aircraft that was not new, but rather converted from a military airframe, and one that could not even be received on time by the delivery deadline.
Furthermore, if the delivery deadline is not met, the vendor must pay liquidated damages for delay. This is money the vendor must forfeit commensurate with the delivery delay. The rate specified in the contract is 0.075% per day. However, because the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters postponed the delivery deadline itself as requested by the vendor, these penalties were not incurred at all.
The Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters explains that, instead, it agreed to receive free operational support of a helicopter from the manufacturer during the spring wildfire season.
Ultimately, the helicopter contracted by the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters did not arrive in December 2025; instead, an entirely different helicopter, which currently sits at the headquarters, flew into South Korea.
What Model Came Instead of Unit 1?With delivery delayed, a hole opened up in the Korea Forest Service's spring wildfire response.
In exchange for extending the delivery deadline, the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters agreed to receive one helicopter free of charge from Columbia. That aircraft is N473CH, which currently sits in the hangar. In its modification request, Columbia proposed to "convert the CH-47D N473CH helicopter to a 234SP configuration and deliver it," adding that it "anticipates being able to deliver N473CH by the end of this year." The end of 2025 has passed, and this aircraft remains registered in the United States.
On the FAA registry, this aircraft is listed with manufacturer Columbia, model CH-47D, serial number 92-0283, and airworthiness category "Restricted / Forest." The Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters answered to the National Assembly that the aircraft's original model was a CH-47C, manufactured in 1985.
Reporters traced the history of this aircraft further back through U.S. Army serial number records and Chinook airframe historical data. Number 92-0283 is an airframe that Boeing remanufactured from the U.S. Army's CH-47C 85-24740 into a D model in January 1993, receiving a new serial number.
Its original form, 85-24740, was not an aircraft built in the United States. Public records list this aircraft as a CH-47C produced under license by Italy's Elicotteri Meridionali (an Agusta affiliate), one of 11 units originally slated for delivery to Iran that were canceled due to the 1979 revolution. The year "1985" provided by the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters matches the fiscal year in which the U.S. Army acquired the aircraft.
After becoming a D model, the aircraft was put up for auction by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) in October 2014, and Columbia acquired it in February 2015, registering it as N473CH. After operating at wildfire sites across the western United States, including California, Oregon, and Utah, it arrived in South Korea in January 2026 under the pretext of free operational support. While the contract was signed one way, a helicopter that does not actually belong to South Korea ended up sitting in its hangar.
Who Ultimately Owns the Helicopter in the Hangar?In an explanatory release on February 17, the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters stated that this helicopter was being "operated as a preemptive measure to prevent a gap in wildfire response until formal delivery in June 2027."
It also noted that Columbia would "bear all costs required for operation, excluding fuel costs, such as pilot labor costs and insurance premiums." It gave an even clearer answer to the National Assembly: "Because it has not acquired domestic airworthiness certification required by the contract, it is not in a state accepted by the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters. Therefore, ownership and management responsibility remain with the manufacturer to date," and its flights this spring were "not a delivery or lease, but (...) free operational support provided by (...) the manufacturer."
The legal basis is permission for domestic use of foreign aircraft under Article 101 of the Aviation Safety Act. An aircraft of U.S. nationality, lacking domestic registration and domestic airworthiness certification, flew temporarily with permission from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. A Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters official stated, "Because that aircraft is not our aircraft, we cannot pilot a foreign aircraft."
This past spring, this helicopter flew for 89 hours. Under the contract, the free support periods are from February 1 to May 31 this year and next year. Once that period ends, the American crew departs, and flying it again during the autumn wildfire season requires separate consultations with the vendor.
The money has already been disbursed. In June 2026, the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters answered to the National Assembly that it had paid $17,594,850—which corresponds to "70% of $25,135,500 out of the contract amount of $25,398,000"—in two installments.
Originally, special conditions capped pre-delivery payments at 50%, combining a 10% advance payment and a 40% interim payment. However, when amending the contract in October 2025, the terms were changed so that "an additional 30% could be paid on top of the existing 40% interim payment, conditional upon the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters securing priority lien rights over the helicopter scheduled for delivery and completing inspection after the aircraft arrives at the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters." The contracted helicopter does not yet exist, and the helicopter in the hangar is not South Korea's, yet 70% of the purchase price has already gone to the American firm.
Where Did It Go Wrong?The trajectory of Unit 1, as retraced by reporters, can be summarized as follows:
The Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters set a condition requiring delivery in a state where South Korean government certification was complete, while opening the door for companies without certification to bid as long as they submitted a plan. Columbia proposed a newly manufactured model with a type certificate and won by 0.18 points on price score. However, at the time the contract was signed, that model was already difficult to manufacture as a new build under U.S. regulations, and the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters was unaware of those regulations.
Two years and three months later, when the vendor acknowledged in writing that it had been an "unrealistic proposal," the model was changed, the deadline was extended by one year and six months, liquidated damages for delay were avoided, and in the meantime, a helicopter unrelated to the original contract entered the hangar under U.S. registration while 70% of the purchase price was paid.
The conditions in the Request for Proposals were not wrong. What went wrong was the process of signing the contract without verifying whether the proposal could actually fulfill those conditions, and remaining unaware of the failure to verify until the vendor itself pointed it out.
Whether this contract modification was justifiable, what reviews the Korea Forest Aviation Headquarters undertook, and how other agencies negotiating with the same vendor during the same period assessed the situation will be covered in the next installment.
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