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Authorities are on high alert following a series of blatant security-violating crimes committed by Greater China nationals near South Korea-U.S. military facilities across the country.
The methods are becoming increasingly organized and sophisticated, ranging from posing as tourists or international students to monitor military installations over extended periods, using specialized equipment to intercept communications, and approaching internal personnel.
According to investigative authorities including the police on August 13, the National Security Investigation Bureau of the Gyeonggi Nambu Provincial Police Agency arrested two individuals in their early 60s earlier this month who are former members of the Chinese military (People's Liberation Army) on charges including aiding the enemy under the Criminal Act.
A, a Chinese national in his 60s, is accused of illegally wiretapping communication frequencies between fighter jets and the control tower while staying at a hotel near Gunsan Air Base in North Jeolla Province—where South Korea-U.S. Air Force assets are stationed—in April.
It was also confirmed that A, a former Chinese military service member, entered South Korea multiple times on tourist visas starting in January this year, coinciding with South Korea-U.S. joint military training periods.
B, a Chinese national of Korean descent in his 40s, was arrested on charges of collecting classified information under a false identity while operating a military surplus store near the main gate of U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys (K-6) in Pyeongtaek from November 2021 to May of this year.
B recruited a South Korean employee inside the base to obtain materials related to the Freedom Shield (FS) and Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercises as well as command personnel documents, and he also directly observed and filmed weapons movements inside the base.
B is also reported to be a former veteran who served in the People's Liberation Army.
As both individuals attempted to leak classified information using sophisticated methods, police are conducting forensics on seized electronic devices and intensively investigating the background, including whether the gathered information was leaked to Chinese authorities.
This is not the first time Greater China nationals have been caught engaging in activities aiding the enemy near domestic military bases.
Previously in May, two teenage Chinese high school students who traveled around major South Korea-U.S. military facilities and international airports to take unauthorized photos of fighter jets and attempt to intercept air traffic control communications were sentenced to prison terms of up to two years on charges including aiding the enemy.
This marked the first time foreigners were charged with aiding the enemy.
Equipped with telephoto lenses, they captured hundreds of precise photos of fighter jets taking off and landing as well as control facilities at four military installations—including Suwon Air Base, Osan Air Base (K-55) and the U.S. base (K-6) in Pyeongtaek, and Cheongju Air Base—and three international airports including Incheon, from the second half of 2024 to March of last year.
There was also a case where a Chinese intelligence organization directly recruited active-duty soldiers to steal South Korea-U.S. joint exercise secrets.
The Defense Counterintelligence Command uncovered a case last year in which a Chinese organization disguised themselves as soldiers to infiltrate open chat rooms joined by active-duty service members, recruiting troops by offering money in exchange for classified information.
The recruited soldier was an active-duty sergeant serving at a frontline unit in Yanggu, Gangwon Province, who smuggled an unauthorized mobile phone into the base and transmitted internal materials to the Chinese side, including UFS implementation plans, key target locations, and personal information of joint exercise managers.
Subsequent military prosecution investigations revealed that this soldier was born in China, and spent most of his childhood in Beijing under a Chinese mother and a maternal grandfather who served as a Chinese Rocket Force officer.
It was found that he was connected to an operations team under the Military Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army after posting photos of himself in military uniform on Chinese social media.
In addition, two Taiwan nationals were caught trespassing and photographing fighter jets at an air show held at Osan Air Base (K-55) in Pyeongtaek in May of last year, and received suspended prison sentences in their appellate trials.
In August of the same year, two Chinese tourists were caught red-handed using drones to film the area around the Jeju Naval Base, showing how major military strongholds across the country are becoming targets.
In fact, data submitted by the Korean National Police Agency to Representative Yoo Yong-won of the People Power Party, a member of the National Assembly's National Defense Committee, shows that among 14 foreigners referred (or not referred) for prosecution under the Military Base and Military Installation Protection Act from 2020 to August 2025, half—7 individuals—were caught intensively in the single year of 2025, and all of them were either Chinese (4) or Taiwanese (3).
The military authorities are also deeply concerned about the recurring security-violating incidents involving foreigners.
In response, they are proposing proactive alternatives, such as strengthening cooperation with related agencies.
Regarding the background of why the police, rather than the military, investigated the recent arrest of the two former Chinese military personnel, a Ministry of National Defense official explained, "This case is being investigated by the police targeting civilians (foreigners), and the currently applied charges do not fall under the jurisdiction of military investigative agencies under the Military Court Act."
Regarding future measures, the official stated, "The military is closely cooperating with related agencies such as the police, and if criminal charges falling under the jurisdiction of military investigative agencies are confirmed in the future, we plan to respond strictly in accordance with relevant laws and regulations."
Experts warn that such espionage activities go beyond isolated incidents and pose a fatal threat directly tied to the security of the Korean Peninsula.
Yoo Ji-hoon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), pointed out, "Even if communication patterns, training schedules, or key personnel information are fragmented, if accumulated and analyzed over a long period, they can completely expose the force deployment and operational patterns of the South Korea-U.S. combined forces." He added, "Wiretapping from outside bases or approaching insiders (HUMINT) is difficult to block with existing access-control-centered security systems alone."
Yoo particularly emphasized, "If such vulnerabilities in information protection recur, the U.S. side may raise concerns regarding the management of sensitive information within South Korea, which could ultimately adversely affect the reliability of intelligence sharing between South Korea and the U.S." He stressed, "It is urgent to establish a multi-domain integrated counterintelligence system where the National Intelligence Service, police, military counterintelligence agencies, and U.S. Forces Korea constantly share signs and analyze patterns such as long-term stays or specific radio wave receptions."
The amended Criminal Act, which takes effect on the 13th of next month by expanding the application of espionage charges from "enemy states" to "foreign states," is expected to serve as an institutional shield to close these gaps.
Yoo suggested, "The enforcement of the amended law will serve as an opportunity to expand the counterintelligence concept, which has traditionally focused on North Korea, into a multi-national, multi-domain threat response system," adding, "Rather than blindly controlling specific nationalities, we must upgrade our detection capabilities centering on behavioral patterns of information access toward military and high-tech facilities."
(Photo: Provided by the Republic of Korea Air Force, Yonhap News)
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