The Difficulty of Being a Soldier Under Progressive Governments

It was revealed that Lt. Gen. Han Ki-sung, commander of the Army's 1st Corps, not only instructed subordinate units to conduct guard duty with unloaded weapons, but also issued guidelines to refrain from warning communications and warning shots when North Korean troops approach, drawing harsh criticism for the military from opposition parties. Earlier, it was discovered that the Army's 21st Infantry Division had changed its regulations to require soldiers to carry batons instead of rifles when on guard duty at main gates. Criticisms are growing that military discipline has slackened under the Lee Jae-myung administration.

There is a tendency in civil-military relations subtly connected to guard duty with unloaded guns, refraining from warning communications and shots, and carrying batons. The perception of North Korea under progressive administrations is friendly. Because progressive administrations like the Lee Jae-myung administration pursue peace alongside North Korea, the military comes under direct and indirect pressure to tone down its inherent aggressiveness. Amid the government's atmosphere of reluctant military conflict between the two Koreas, the military falls into conflict and temptation, asking itself, "Should I slightly loosen my finger resting on the trigger?" Suppressing attack instincts while constantly treading carefully makes it far from easy to serve as a soldier.

In addition, the military under progressive administrations is forced onto a chessboard stripped of its key pieces. Due to the deep-rooted antipathy of progressive governments toward generals from the Korea Military Academy (KMA), the military leadership is formed on the principle of "excluding KMA graduates and favoring non-KMA officers." This effectively sidelines top-tier officers en masse, making it anti-security, uneconomical, and irrational. On top of that, under the Lee Jae-myung administration, the KMA has been saddled with the stigma of martial law and set on a path toward disbandment.

Progressive administrations hold a friendly perception of North Korea. In contrast, the military always views North Korea hostiles. This creates a conflict between civilian and military perceptions of North Korea. Consequently, progressive governments tend to distrust the military and attempt to interfere with and control it through methods such as easing operational guidelines. This tendency of progressive administrations became clearly visible starting with the Kim Dae-jung administration, the first progressive administration since the end of military dictatorship and the onset of civilian control.

During the First Battle of Yeonpyeong in June 1999 and the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in June 2002, the rule prohibiting preemptive firing ordered by former President Kim Dae-jung was applied. Easing operational guidelines to the level of prohibiting preemptive firing represents the highest level of government interference and control over the military. In June 2001, when large North Korean merchant ships repeatedly intruded into South Korean territorial waters, the South Korean Navy was unable to execute any rules of engagement such as search, boarding, stopping, or seizure. The government instructed the Navy to operate only with the approval of the Minister of National Defense and the NSC, but the minister and the NSC failed to issue any clear guidelines.

It was no different during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. When North Korean fishing boats frequently crossed the NLL between May and November 2003, former President Roh issued defensive directives: "Ensure that accidental clashes do not occur" and "Establish a framework to settle peace in the West Sea." Former President Roh's determination to prevent accidental clashes materialized in the June 4 inter-Korean agreement in 2004, which mandated that naval vessels from both sides communicate via a common international merchant marine network. The military was displeased. On July 14, 2004, after firing warning shots to repel a North Korean vessel that violated the NLL, the Navy concealed the fact that communications had taken place.

Under the Moon Jae-in administration as well, there was a relaxation of operational guidelines, although it was not made official. The content of the relaxed guidelines was known to require responding only after accurately verifying North Korean provocations. For instance, if North Korean troops fired southward from the Military Demarcation Line, South Korean forces were to respond only after confirming clear damage from the hit.

To date, nothing has been revealed regarding what measures the Lee Jae-myung administration has issued to the military concerning operational guidelines. However, actions identified in the 1st Corps and 21st Division—such as guard duty with unloaded guns, refraining from warning communications and shots, and carrying batons—are evaluated as military behavior patterns likely to emerge under progressive administrations, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. An Army general tutted, saying, "If the current administration were conservative, would the commander of the 1st Corps or the 25th Division have even imagined unloaded guns or batons?"

The Moon Jae-in administration was the first among progressive administrations to break ground in neglecting KMA graduates. In the August 2017 four-star general reshuffle, General Jeong Kyeong-doo, who was Air Force Chief of Staff, was appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—a position traditionally dominated by the Army. Among the Army's five four-star generals—including the Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, and commanders of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Field Armies—two positions were given to non-KMA graduates from ROTC and the 3rd Military Academy. Articles poured out with headlines such as "Surge of Non-KMA Officers."

Four months later, a major military reshuffle was conducted, promoting 77 officers to brigadier general, 30 to major general, and 2 to lieutenant general. While the proportion of non-KMA officers had previously been below 20%, it jumped into the 30% range. The highlight came in September 2020 with the appointment of General Nam Yeong-shin, an ROTC graduate, as Army Chief of Staff. He was the first non-KMA chief of staff in 51 years. General Nam pushed so hard to appoint non-KMA officers that he asked a reporter during a luncheon, "We need to raise the proportion of non-KMA generals, so please help out for a few months."

The exclusion of KMA graduates by the Lee Jae-myung administration, which launched after overcoming the December 3 martial law, is perhaps an inevitable outcome. Through the November military reshuffle last year, which replaced two-thirds of all lieutenant generals in the armed forces, the formula "KMA is given the cold shoulder under progressive administrations" was solidified. Among the 14 Army officers promoted to lieutenant general, five were non-KMA officers.

Furthermore, the KMA is destined to be disbanded under the Lee Jae-myung administration. The Ministry of National Defense and the Democratic Party had previously cited strengthening army-navy-air force jointness, preparing for future warfare, and attracting top talent as objectives for integrating the service academies, but that was not the case. During a defense policy briefing on August 5, President Lee Jae-myung made it clear that integrating the military academies was a matter of punishment and accountability for the KMA.

The interaction between conservative administrations and the military is the exact opposite of that under progressive administrations. Conservative governments and the military share the same hostile perception of North Korea. Conservative governments have no reason to control military operations. They fully recognize the military's discretion and guarantee its autonomy.

A prime example is the Battle of Daecheong in November 2009 during the Lee Myung-bak administration. When a North Korean patrol boat fired around 50 rounds, South Korean naval vessels retaliated 100 times over with 4,950 rounds, and then-Defense Minister Kim Tae-young explained the situation by stating, "We have given instructions to local commanders so they can act at their discretion." There were even instances when South Korean forces fired warning shots toward North Korean guard posts or vessels while South Korean seniors visited Mount Kumgang for family reunions.

It was no different under the Park Geun-hye administration. In October 2014, a trio of high-ranking North Korean officials attended the closing ceremony of the Incheon Asian Games, creating an atmosphere for inter-Korean dialogue. Three days after the trio returned, when a North Korean patrol boat violated the NLL, South Korean naval vessels opened fire, and then-JCS Chairman Choi Yoon-hee said, "We responded with aimed fire to destroy based on the Chairman's guidelines and the judgment of the local unit."

Conservative administrations' operational guidelines on North Korea are represented by the "act first, report later" policy established by former Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin. Under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, this evolved into the "immediately, strongly, and until the end" guideline. Defense ministers, JCS chairmen, and service chiefs invoked the right to self-defense at every opportunity, stimulating the military's aggressive instincts. The military's autonomy grew stronger through conservative administrations.

Conservative administrations also showed exceptional favor toward the KMA. Under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, the positions of Army Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, and Ground Operations Commander became exclusive to KMA graduates. Only the position of 2nd Operational Commander—considered less critical as a rear position—was permitted to non-KMA officers. The ratio of general officers from KMA versus non-KMA, which stood at 6 to 4 in the latter half of the Moon Jae-in administration, widened to nearly 8 to 2 under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration.

Soldiers unanimously voice that serving under progressive administrations is painful. Many officers complain that the "mother-in-law" at the presidential office interferes in every detail, and having to factor in political considerations during North Korea operations causes severe headaches. Under conservative administrations, soldiers' circumstances flip 180 degrees. They worry less about reading the presidential office's mood, and nobody scolds them for shooting according to instinct. They can act as trained and as their reflexes dictate. Serving as a soldier is relatively comfortable.

Does that mean conservative administrations handle national security well? Not necessarily. There are significant concerns that mindless firing of guns and artillery regardless of inter-Korean dialogue or family reunions at Mount Kumgang, along with reckless exercises of self-defense that could trigger war at the military's own whim, damage national security. The autonomy granted to the military by past conservative administrations was excessive.

What is needed is civilian control positioned somewhere between interference and autonomy. Only when balanced and moderate civilian control agreed upon by both progressive and conservative administrations is at work can soldiers stably defend the nation without swaying from left to right depending on who holds power. Reducing the division between KMA and non-KMA officers will also help preserve high-level combat capability. This is a direction that benefits national security across the board.

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