▲ U.S. President Donald Trump (left) and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
If the nuclear agreement signed by the United States and Saudi Arabia on the 22nd (local time) takes effect, it is expected to send substantial shockwaves through the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.
This comes as reports indicate that the pact, known as the "123 Agreement" based on Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, potentially allows Saudi Arabia to domestically enrich and reprocess nuclear materials—unlike previous agreements—thereby opening a path to the future production of weapons-grade nuclear material.
U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the nuclear agreement and a bilateral safe-guards agreement, the U.S. Department of Energy officially announced on the same day.
The Energy Department explained that it "maintains high standards of nuclear safety, security, and nuclear non-proliferation," but did not disclose specific details of the agreement.
According to reports from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), The New York Times (NYT), and Reuters, the discussed framework involves the U.S. building nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia and transferring uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing (plutonium extraction) technologies for reactor fuel, using a "black box" approach that permits only U.S. personnel access to enrichment and reprocessing operations.
The issue is the potential removal of the "safety pin" that completely bans uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction for Saudi Arabia.
Reports suggest that, provided commercial viability is proven during a two-year joint study, Saudi Arabia would be able to mine or import uranium buried within its territory and enrich it.
The NYT pointed out that this means the U.S. President could exercise a waiver over a core clause of existing 123 Agreements, which states that "enrichment, reprocessing, and transfer of nuclear materials are impossible without U.S. approval."
According to the Congressional Research Service, all 26 existing agreements the U.S. has concluded with 51 countries were approved without waiver measures.
This is being compared to a recent case involving the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which in 2009 became the only Middle Eastern nation to sign a 123 Agreement with the United States.
The UAE accepted the relinquishment of the right to produce its own nuclear fuel, referred to as the "gold standard," and permitted strict inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under an additional protocol.
Saudi Arabia has resisted both the gold standard and the additional protocol throughout years of negotiations with the U.S.
Based on reports so far, Saudi Arabia is considered to have largely achieved its stance.
This is why the international community, including neighboring Middle Eastern countries, suspects Saudi Arabia's "hidden motives."
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated in 2018 that "if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will follow suit."
Although the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have clearly drawn the line, stating that this agreement does not lead to nuclear weapons development, concerns are rising that it could trigger a chain reaction of a "nuclear domino" effect among Middle Eastern nations, including Turkey and Egypt.
In particular, it seems difficult to avoid criticism that the U.S.—which has been waging a war for five months while demanding that Iran dismantle its nuclear program and ship out nuclear materials—applied a double standard for its own interests.
In fact, it is observed that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia will reap massive tangible and intangible economic and diplomatic benefits through this agreement.
The U.S. is expected to exclusively supply the AP1000 reactor from its domestic nuclear vendor, Westinghouse.
Analyses suggest that the contract alone won by Westinghouse will be worth billions of dollars (NYT), and the economic impact of the agreement, valid for 30 years, will reach tens of billions of dollars (WSJ).
Along with the effect of blocking the influence of China and Russia—which have eyed Saudi nuclear plant construction—there are also discussions that the U.S. could secure a quid pro quo of Saudi Arabia recognizing Israel and joining the "Abraham Accords."
By building nuclear power plants, Saudi Arabia can divert crude oil previously used for domestic thermal power generation toward exports while reducing carbon emissions.
This is a policy declared by Crown Prince bin Salman, as Saudi Arabia currently derives 68 percent of its electricity from natural gas and 32 percent from oil.
For Saudi Arabia, which competes with Iran and Turkey for the status of Middle Eastern hegemony, the fact that it has received U.S. "certification" is an aspect that cannot be ignored in terms of solidifying its standing.
Karen Young at Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy analyzed that Saudi Arabia's "prestige in the region" is elevated.
Kristin Diwan, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, diagnosed, "It's a big commercial and geopolitical victory in terms of enriching American corporations and binding Saudi Arabia closer to the U.S.," while adding, "The damage done to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is substantial."
While no official stance has yet emerged from Israel, which will be most affected by the U.S.-Saudi nuclear pact, foreign media reported that reactions are mixed between views that civilian nuclear programs are nothing to worry about and concerns that they could evolve for military use.
Israeli Economy and Industry Minister Nir Barkat said in a radio interview, "If they want it for peaceful purposes, meaning energy needs, we can live with that."
On the other hand, opposition politician and former Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman pointed out, "Every military nuclear program starts from a civilian program."
This agreement is highly likely to be approved by the U.S. Congress.
This is because blocking it would require passing a joint resolution in both the Senate and the House of Representatives and securing a two-thirds majority vote to override a presidential veto.
If the agreement falls through, Reuters anticipated that Saudi Arabia could look to China, Russia, or South Korea and France—which built plants in the UAE—as alternatives.
The NYT reported that Saudi Arabia has indeed reviewed options to receive bids from these countries.
(Photo: AP, Yonhap News)
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